Reverberations of Dharmakirti’s Philosophy

by Birgit Kellner | 2020 | 264,305 words

This page relates ‘Dharmakirti on the Role of Salvific Initiation’ of the study on the philosophy of Dharmakirti (6th century) and his predecessor Dignaga (5th century). This collection of articles reflects philosophical currents in India, China and Tibet during their time and investigates the Buddhist theories of Pramana (“instruments of trustworthy awareness”).

Dharmakīrti on the Role of Salvific Initiation

(By Cristina Pecchia)

[Full title: Dharmakīrti on the Role of Salvific Initiation and the Reception of His Critique in the Later Śaiva Tradition by Cristina Pecchia]

In memory of Helmut Krasser

Research for the present article, which was completed in 2015, was generously funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in the framework of the stand-alone project “Indian Buddhist epistemology and the path to liberation” (P 26120–G15), based at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna. I would like to thank Diwakar Acharya and Patrick McAllister for their careful reading of this article and their very helpful observations.

Towards the end of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika (= PV II) Dharmakīrti examines various non-Buddhist theories about how to attain liberation. In this context, he discusses the function of the ritual of dīkṣā, “initiation,” in attaining the elimination of the soul’s sins or impurities and, thus, the liberation from the cycle of transmigrations.

An original point-by-point refutation of the Buddhist opinion represented in Dharma-kīrti’s text is expounded–as Attilia Sironi has indicated[1] –by Kṣemarāja (approximately 1000–1050 CE)[2] in his commentary on Svacchandatantra V.88, where he provides a survey of different views on initiation. In this way, the target of Dharmakīrti’s critique is confirmed as corresponding to the followers of tantric[3] ideas and practices who advocate a Śaiva type of salvific initiation. Indeed, as observed by Alexis Sanderson and Raffaele Torella, PV II.259ab[4] refers to an initiate who is lighter than before the performance of the initiation,[5] very likely alluding to the tulādīkṣā, a ritual characterized by the use of a balance (tulā). More generally, dīkṣā is described in Śaiva sources as the action that removes all the bonds (pāśas) or innate impurity (mala) which causes rebirth and, therefore, is the necessary step to be made in order to attain liberation.[6] The special type of ritual that includes a balance is widely attested in Śaiva sources, from the early Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā,[7] from sometime between 450 and 550 CE,[8] to later works of eminent authors such as Sadyojyotis and Abhinavagupta.[9]

In what follows I will analyse the PV section on initiation and the related response of Kṣemarāja. The skillful use of rhetorical means seems to shape both texts, in the former adding a sarcastic nuance to the refutation of the opponents’ view, in the latter covertly minimizing the long past Buddhist attack. This investigation will contribute to our understanding of Dharmakīrti’s engagement in discussing contemporary soteriological ideologies and, on the other hand, to our understanding of how his thought reverberated in a later and different intellectual environment such as the Śaiva one.[10]

In this study I take Manorathanandin’s Vṛtti (PVV) as the guiding commentary. The indicators typical of commentarial phraseology (e.g., nanu, cet, and syād etat) show that, in his opinion, PV II.257–267 forms a section in which Dharmakīrti addresses the followers of the Scriptures of the Lord (īśvarāgama) with regard to salvific initiation (hereafter “section on initiation”).[11] The two subsequent kārikas, kk. 268–269, present a discussion of the existence of the self that can be regarded as continuing the refutation of the previous soteriological view; however, it does not display any explicit indications with regard to it.[12]

The section on initiation consists of six short thematic units:[13]

(a) K. 257, where, against those who claim the salvific effects of an initiation, Dhar-makīrti argues that they explain such an effect by resorting to the authority of the Scriptures only–which is not satisfactory.

(b) Kk. 258–259, where, showing the undesired consequences of their claim, he argues that a ritual such as initiation is not sufficient to stop rebirth and that bad deeds are not something that can be embodied.

(c) Kk. 260–261, where Dharmakīrti presents the Buddhist view of how to attain libera-tion, especially focusing on the role of karman in the perpetuation of rebirths.

(d) Kk. 262–264, which concern the nature of karmic impulses (saṃskāras). These are related to the unseen force (adṛṣṭa) of merits and demerits for the upholders of salvific initiation, but to cetanā for the Buddhists.

(e) Kk. 265–266, which explain the role of the mind and the nature of mental faults with regard to the cognitive faculties’ agency and rebirth.

(f) K. 267, where Dharmakīrti explains that the nature of the mind cannot be permanent.

After stating the unacceptability of resorting to Scriptures to argue for salvific initiation, Dharmakīrti points out that, when urged to prove the efficacy of initiation, the followers of the Scriptures of the Lord adduce arguments which lead to prasaṅgas. For they compare the efficacy of initiation with the efficacy of rituals applied to physical objects and consider the initiate’s weighing less after the performance of the ritual a proof of the initiate’s elimination of sins and attainment of liberation.

Dharmakīrti explicitly identifies the former alleged proof as implying the undesired consequence that one would then have to believe in the salvific power of other rituals, too, such as oil massage or scorching oneself with fire. A human being would be like a seed: if treated with oil or burnt by fire, it does not generate a sprout (k. 258cd). Further, Dharmakīrti covertly suggests that the opponents’ proof implies a prasaṅga; for, saying that even the initiates’ loss of their entire weight would not be a proof of their loss of sins (k. 259c), he alludes to the eventual implication that liberation corresponds to having no weight at all. To this he adds the inference “sin is not heavy because it is not embodied” (k. 259d), which refutes the opponents’ implicit inference that is based on the reason “because sin is embodied”–a reason that may be indicative of another fact such as the loss of sins after initiation only within a physicalist view of sins. Although Dharmakīrti does not expand on this, his audience can go back to the refutation of the materialist view on rebirth explained in a previous part of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter,[14] where, showing that the mental does not depend on the corporeal, he argued for the non-physicality of faults that prevent living beings from attaining liberation.

The opening of Dharmakīrti’s critique of salvific initiation seems to be designed to persuade the audience, before any demonstration, of the evident implausibility of a soteriological method based on a ritual ceremony. In fact, the examples of an oil massage and a ritual with a balance easily remind one of magical treatments and freak shows. Mentioning them, Dharmakīrti seems to be adopting a rhetorical strategy that reinforces the prasaṅgas with which his refutation begins: he intentionally exposes the simplicity of the opponents’ soteriological proposal and the unsophisticatedness of their proof, also evoking the unreliability and negligibility of the latter.

His refutation continues with a more general assertion, at kk. 260–261, concerning the causes of rebirth from the Buddhist point of view. The content of the text is quite similar to the idea expounded at PV II.81 and 189, where Dharmakīrti states that rebirth is rooted in misjudgement and thirst, and it is thirst rather than karma that ultimately effects the setting in motion of the continuum of the five skandhas.[15] Arguing against salvific initiation, he not only reasserts the primacy of cognitive and emotional experience, but also emphasizes the subordinate role of karma in the Buddhist discourse on liberation. Moreover, he elaborates on the nature of ignorance and thirst by saying that they are cetanā (“intention,” or “volition”) and are connected with karma (te cetane svayaṃ karmety –k. 261c). His formulation refers to a notion that appears in canonical and Abhidharmic sources[16] –famously in AN III.415[17] and in AK 4.1ab, where it is said that the manifold world is caused by karma, which is characterized by intention (karmajaṃ lokavaicitryaṃ cetanā tatkṛtaṃ ca tat).

The subsequent text features a more committed Dharmakīrti, who explains why salvific initiation is considered problematic and takes into serious account his opponents’ argument. In a Buddhist soteriological perspective, he states, it is the series of seeds continuously generating mental faults that has to be stopped, but initiation, as a ritual, does not have any impact on mental faults.

Upholders of salvific initiation can argue against this stance focussing on the nature and role of karma. Their main argument is concerned with the nature of saṃskāras, “karmic impulses,” which in their view are linked to adṛṣṭa (“the unseen”), a latent force from which physical and mental actions ultimately derive and which is eliminated through initiation. From a Buddhist point of view, however, the saṃskāras are connected to cetanā,[18] which performs its function as long as the sense faculties exist. Therefore, a ritual performance such as initiation, which does not affect the sense faculties’ capacity of being operative, cannot hinder their capacity of generating physical and mental activity (kk. 262–264).

The two positions are based on antithetic doctrinal views. Dharmakīrti takes the oppor-tunity to discuss them as regards their implications in view of rebirth, shifting the focus to the causes of rebirth, i.e., mental faults. He has the upholders of salvific initiation point out that if actions are linked to the mind only, the absence of mind–which is the case at the time of death–would also imply the absence of rebirth. The Buddhist reply to this is that mental impurities are what links the mind to another birth; therefore, one could accept initiation as a means to liberation only if such a special ritual affected this capacity of the impurities. But the Buddhists do not believe that a ritual performance can determine the results of future actions, since it cannot affect the series of mental faults which arise from their own seeds, and whose capacity and perpetuation depends on the presence of what nourishes them, i.e., the view of a self (kk. 265–266).

However, the mention of bījas in the present context seems to be parallel to the example of a bīja in k. 258, where Dharmakīrti refers to the special treatment of a seed that hinders the seed’s capacity of generating a sprout. Thus, the discussion of the effects of initiation seems to be intentionally enclosed between two references to bījas which, given their difference, amplify the polarization of the debate over the causes of rebirth. On the Buddhist side, the metaphor of the seed (bīja) in relation to the series of faults is linked to the traditional view of causation referred to in texts such as the Śālistambasūtra and the AK, where the stock example is the arising of a sprout from a seed and other causes. It should be noted that this metaphor is not predictable in Dharmakīrti’s work. In fact, it piles up especially in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter and occurs in a few places of the Svārthānumāna and Pratyakṣa chapters of the Pramāṇavārttika, suggesting that Dharmakīrti mentioned the example of the seed in order to show how his philosophical discourse linked to the Abhidharmic tradition. The informed discussion of salvific initiation presented in the PV confirms that materials relating to groups of Śaiva worshippers were available to Dharmakīrti and his audience as significant parts of their religious and intellectual environment.[19] Further, although the intellectual apparatus of the tantric communities was very likely still quite thin, these groups were probably well aware of the necessity of having their soteriological programme legitimized at various levels. The fact that they provide a physical proof of the validity of their ritual procedure is indeed telling about their programmatic effort of gaining a place in society for their soteriological proposal. When Dharmakīrti specifically refers to the tulādīkṣā, he is not only arguing against another way of attaining liberation, but also, or primarily, against the demonstrative value attached to a ritual performance, as if liberation from suffering could be equated to a reduction of bodily weight. The tulādīkṣā was a perfect example to this end, namely casting a bad light on the tantric proposal for liberation.

However, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to specify the identity of Dharmakīrti’s target, whether he was addressing various groups that shared some basic ideas based on their belief in īśvara, or practitioners whose ideology was represented in a particular tantric work. Some key terms in the section on initiation point to ideas and practices that correspond to those attested in the Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā, testifying to early forms of concepts that will develop and appear in later tantric texts in different forms and sometimes under different names. A case in point is the idea of impurity, which is referred to as pāpa (“bad deed” or “sin”) in the Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā and in the PV section on initiation. The term pāpa mentioned at k. 259 refers to an imperceptible material substance (dravya) and is contrasted with mala (k. 265), which Dharmakīrti uses to designate mental impurity within a Buddhist discourse, as can be seen in PV II.208–209 and 212.[20] Thus, the PV section on initiation bears witness to a stage of the development of tantric doctrines earlier than that attested in the Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha (not later than the middle of the seventh century),[21] where the term mala, together with pāśas (bonds), denotes three distinct types of impurities that cover the soul. Indeed, D. Acharya has argued that strong criticism from the Buddhists urged the Śaivas to reformulate their claims on the removal of sin through initiation. It is to be noted that the tantric doctrinal development reflected by the use of the term mala in extant written sources does not correspond to a change in the role of initiation, which maintains its function of making Śiva intervene in the initiand’s life and allowing the initiand to eventually attain liberation.[22]

The concept of impurities features prominently in section V.88 of Kṣemarāja’s Uddyota on Svacchandatantra (SvaTU), which concludes the chapter concerning tantric initiation. In the pūrvapakṣa he has the Buddhists (saugatāḥ) dispute tantric purification and its four possible objects, which are the self, the mind, actions, and impurities such as the view of a self.[23] Also, at the beginning of his response to the Buddhist criticism he explains the Śaiva typology of impurities which cover the self.[24] In both cases, he seems to be blissfully unaware of earlier articulations of the tantric concept of impurity.

The Buddhists mentioned by Kṣemarāja, as Sironi has shown, can be easily identified with Dharmakīrti and followers of his ideas, since most of the arguments in the pūrvapakṣa consist in a free paraphrase of formulations found in the PV section on initiation. Also, the uttarapakṣa includes citations from the same passage.

The following issues from the pūrvapakṣa, in particular, can be linked to the PV:

1) If the mind were not capable of moving the senses after initiation, the senses of an initiate could not be active (SvaTU 75.1f. → PV II.265cd).

2) Mental faults together with their karmic impressions do not disappear in an initiate (SvaTU 75.2f. → PV II.266cd).

3) If the mind were eradicated immediately after initiation, the body would dissolve and there would not be any activity (SvaTU 75.3ff. → PV II.264d–265a).

4) The āgama as a valid means of cognition (SvaTU 75.10f. → PV II.257).

5) If actions could be destroyed only by initiation because they are not embodied, they would not possess any power even in the case of an oil massage or scorching oneself with fire; also, if the initiation with scales (dhaṭadīkṣā)[25] makes the initiate lighter, sin should be embodied (SvaTU 75.11–76.1 → PV II.258–259).

In his discussion Kṣemarāja avails himself of the devices elaborated in a centuries-long reflection within non-dualist Śaiva thought. However, while arguing from a coherent and mature perspective, he also seems to employ a rhetorical strategy aiming to neutralize the negative nuance covertly generated by Dharmakīrti’s remarks on initiation. As can be seen in Table 1, he in fact reverses the PV sequence of arguments. The segment PV II.258–259, which presents a prasaṅga and Dharmakīrti’s sarcastic remarks against initiation, appears only at the end of Kṣemarāja’s pūrvapakṣa and is split in two parts in the uttarapakṣa, where k. 258 is discussed at the very beginning and k. 259 towards the end, followed by a defense of the validity of the Śaiva Scriptures.

In his response, Kṣemarāja first states that Dharmakīrti’s critique concerning the unde-sired consequence of ritual initiation in fact reveals the risibility of the Buddhist point of view.[26] He then adduces the argument of mantras, which, given their inconceivable power, also possess the capacity of eliminating bonds.[27]

Table 1: Arrangement of PV II.257–267 (on ritual initiation) in Kṣemarāja’s Uddyota on Svacchandatantra V.88

PV kārikās grouped in the-matic units according to the PVV PV kārikās in the SvaTU pūrvapakṣaa PV kārikās in the SvaTU uttarapakṣa
257 265cd (75.1f.) 258 (77.5f.)
258–259 266cd (75.2f.) 266cd (77.15f.)
260–261 264d–265a (75.3ff.) 262a–c, 264 (80.14f., 18f.)
262–264 257 (75.10f.) 259c (81.1)
265–266 258ac–259 (75.11–76.1) 257 (82.7f.)
267   [256 (82.10f.)]
a Page and line numbers of the SvaTU edition are given in brackets.


One of his main concerns, however, is the nature of faults and the means for their final elimination. The view expounded in PV II.266, in particular, engages him in a longer analysis aiming to demonstrate, first, that the cleansing of impurities is not distinct from that of the self and, second, that initiation can hinder the arising of faults because it has the capacity of eventually effecting the purification of the self. In this connection, Kṣemarāja argues again for the special powers of mantras. Even if they cannot cancel the karman that supports the present body and its related passions, they are able to hinder any future arising of bonds (pāśas). Their way of operating is exemplified by the case of an ugly man who by means of mantras obtains a very beautiful wife, although his ugliness is not cancelled.[28]

Kṣemarāja’s emphasis on the force of mantras in connection with karman and impurities points out his commitment in holding onto the tradition and providing evidence for its tenability. A similar commitment is shown when he explains the loss of weight after initiation, which he regards as being due to the elimination of the cause of weight, namely tamas. A quite different attitude was possible, though, as is evident from Abhinavagupta’s consideration of the tulādīkṣā as a means to give confidence to deluded people.[29]

It is worth noting that in both the pūrvapakṣa and the uttarapakṣa Kṣemarāja does not refer to contents of the PV section on initiation which focus on the role of karman (PV II.260–261) and in the pūrvapakṣa he also omits to mention Dharmakīrti’s remarks on the nature of karmic impulses (PV II.262–264a).

Rather, in his response, Kṣemarāja elaborates on the view of the self according to a non-dualist Śaiva doctrine and the value of its purification through initiation:

But in truth liberation is the viewing of the self in that which has the nature of truth, which is made of consciousness, and is admitted as the ultimate reality of any form of action and cognition because it is the ultimate reality of the I-awareness. From any point of view, … liberation is just the manifestation of being Śiva. And in this regard the performance of initiation is for the sake of realizing that one attains that everything is of the same essence after knowing it.

This forms a stark contrast with the Buddhist approach to the way of attaining liberation, which Kṣemarāja describes in the concluding part of the pūrvapakṣa:

Therefore, liberation is nothing but the insight of selflessness preceded by the meditative practice on momentariness and so forth.[30]

His statement shows how a late representative of the Indian intellectual tradition perceived Dharmakīrti’s soteriological stance and can be taken as an answer from within the tradition to the question “Are Buddhist Pramāṇavādins non-Buddhistic?,” which Helmut Krasser asked and discussed in an article of 2004. The SvaTU presentation of Dharmakīrti’s critique on initiation as a method to attain liberation suggests that Kṣemarāja regarded such a critique as being part of a soteriological approach in which typically Buddhist concepts such as momentariness are considered instrumental to practices that lead to liberation according to a Buddhist point of view, namely meditative practices that lead to the realization of selflessness.

References and abbreviations

ASa Manuscript copy of the Alaṅkāra of Prajñākaragupta as reproduced in: Sanskrit manuscripts of Prajñākaraguptas Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam. Facsimile edition by

S. Watanabe. Patna/Narita 1998.

Acharya 2014 D. Acharya, On the Śaiva concept of innate impurity (mala) and the function of the rite of initiation. Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2014) 9–25.

AK Abhidharm-koshabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, ed. P. Pradhan. Patna 1967.

AN The Aṅguttara-Nikāya. Part III, ed. E. Hardy. London[31] 1976 (first published 1897).

Bisschop 2010 P. Bisschop, Śaivism in the Gupta-Vākāṭaka age. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 20 (2010) 477–488.

Eltschinger 2014 V. Eltschinger, Buddhist epistemology as apologetics. Studies on the history, self-understanding and dogmatic foundations of late Indian Buddhist philos-ophy. Wien 2014.

Franco 1997 E. Franco, Dharmakīrti on compassion and rebirth. Wien 1997. Cristina Pecchia 373

Franco 2001 E. Franco, Dharmakīrti’s reductionism in religion and logic. In: Le parole e i marmi. Studi in onore di Raniero Gnoli, ed. R. Torella. Roma 2001, 285–308.

Gnoli 1999 Abhinavagupta, Luce dei Tantra. Tantrāloka, ed. Raniero Gnoli. Milano 1999.

Goodall & Isaacson 2007 D. Goodall and H. Isaacson, Workshop on the Niśvāsatattva-saṃhitā, Newsletter of the NGMCP 3 (2007) 4–6.

Harvey 2011 P. Harvey, An analysis of factors related to the kusala/akusala quality of actions in the Pāli tradition. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33.1–2 (2011) 175–209.

Heim 2013 M. Heim, The forerunner of all things. Buddhaghosa on cetanā. New York 2013.

Inami & Tillemans 1986 M. Inami and T.J.F. Tillemans, Another look at the framework of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of Pramāṇavārttika. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 30 (1986) 123–142.

Keown 1996 D. Keown, Karma, character, and consequentialism. The Journal of Religious Ethics 24.2 (1996) 329–350.

KH Pramāṇavārttika (kārikās) of Dharmakīrti, facsimile of the manuscript in: B. Kellner and F. Sferra, A palm-leaf manuscript of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika from the collection kept by the Nepalese rājaguru Hemarāja Śarman. In: Sanskrit texts from Giuseppe Tuccis collection, ed. F. Sferra. Roma 2008, 443–483.

Krasser 2004 H. Krasser, Are Buddhist Pramāṇavādins non-Buddhistic? Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the impact of logic and epistemology on emancipation. Hōrin 11 (2004) 129–146.

Niśvāsa The Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā. The earliest surviving Śaiva Tantra. Vol. 1. A critical edition & annotated translation of the Mūlasūtra, Uttarasūtra & Nayasūtra, ed. Dominic Goodall, in collaboration with Alexis Sanderson and Harunaga Isaacson, with contributions of Nirajan Kafle, Diwakar Acharya and others. Pondicherry 2015. Pecchia 2015 C. Pecchia, Dharmakīrti on the cessation of suffering. A critical edition with translation and comments of Manorathanandins Vṛtti and Vibhūticandras glosses on Pramāṇavārttika II.190–216. Leiden/Boston 2015.

PV Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti, in PVV and ASa.

PV II Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the PV.

PVV Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathanandin, in: Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24–26 (1938–1940) (for the numbering of the kārikās, see Vetter 1964: 116f.).

Sanderson 1988 A. Sanderson, Śaivism and the Tantric traditions. In: The worlds reli-gions, ed. S. Sutherland et alii. London 1988, 660–703.

Sanderson 1992 A. Sanderson, The doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottara. In: Ritual and speculation in early Tantrism. Studies in honor of André Padoux, ed. T. Goudriaan. Albany 1992, 281–312.

Sanderson 2001 A. Sanderson, History through textual criticism. In the study of Śaivism, the Pañcarātra and the Buddhist Yoginītantras. In: Le sources et le temps. Sources and time: A colloquium, Pondicherry, 11–13 January 1997, ed. François Grimal. Pondicherry 2001, 1–47.

Sironi 1988 A. Sironi, Il commento di Kṣemarāja alla stanza V, 88 dello Svacchandatantra: natura e scopo della dīkṣā. Rivista degli Studi Orientali 61 ([1987] 1988) 89–113.

SvaTU Kṣemarāja, Svacchandatantra-uddyota, ed. M.S. Kaul. 6 vols. Bombay 1921–1935.

Abhinava Gupta, The Tantrāloka. With commentary by Jayaratha Rājānaka, ed. Mukund Rām Shāstri. 6 vols. Bombay 1921.

Taber 2003 J. Taber, Dharmakīrti against physicalism. Journal of Indian Philosophy 31 (2003) 479–502.

TAK III Tāntrikābhidhānakośa III, T–Ph. Dictionnaire des termes techniques de la litter-ature hindoue tantrique. A dictionary of technical terms from Hindu tantric literature. Wörterbuch zur Terminologie hinduistischer Tantren. Wien 2013.

Torella 1992 R. Torella, The pratyabhijña and the logical-epistemological school of Bud-dhism. In: Ritual and speculation in early Tantrism. Studies in honor of André Padoux, ed. T. Goudriaan. Albany 1992, 327–345.

V Pramāṇavārttika kārikās as reflected in the PVV.

Vetter 1964 T. Vetter, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti. Wien 1964.

Vetter 1990 T. Vetter, Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika. Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im Pramāṇasiddhi-Kapitel. Wien[32] 1990 (1st ed. 1984).

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Attilia Sironi, assisted by Raniero Gnoli, has published an Italian translation of the Uddyota passage here under consideration and the relevant part of the PV (Sironi 1988).

[2]:

See Sanderson 1988: 700.

[3]:

As it is not clear when the term tantra became a standard designation for texts of tantric revelation (see Niśvāsa, pp. 30f.), it might be anachronistic to speak of ‘tantric’ ideas and practices in Dharmakīrti’s time.

[4]:

The numbering of the kārikās accords to that established in Vetter 1964: 116f.

[5]:

Sanderson 2001: 10f., n. 7. Raffaele Torella’s identification of the ritual as a Śaiva type of initiation is reported in Franco 2001, n. 24.

[6]:

See, for example, Sanderson 1988: 662, 664ff. and 691; Sanderson 1992: 285; and Acharya 2014: 16f., with nn. 25 and 27.

[7]:

Niśvāsa, Mūlasūtra 7:15ab: tulayā śodhayet pāpam ātmanasya parasya vā; see also Niśvāsa, p. 324, Acharya 2014: 16, and Eltschinger 2014: 123, n. 102.

[8]:

Goodall & Isaacson 2007: 6. Some further remarks concerning the Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā are provided in Sanderson 2001, n. 2, item 7; nn. 5–6; pp. 22f. and 29–31, with notes therein.

[9]:

See TAK III, s.v. tulādīkṣā.

[10]:

See Torella 1992 for some reflexions on the relationships between Pratyabhijñā thought and the Buddhist logical-epistemological system.

[11]:

PVV 98.17: nanūktam īśvareṇāgame’sty ātmā mokṣaś cāsya dīkṣāvidhineti, and 100.15f.:… syād etad ātmano’pi garbhagatakaraṇādijanane vyāpāraḥ sa eva dīkṣayā niruddha iti na punarjanmety.

[12]:

The Tibetan tradition represented in dGe’dun grub pa’s topical outlines (sa bcad) takes the kk. 264–269 as one thematic unit within the section that begins at k. 257 (dbang phyug pa’i grol lam dgag pa –“Refuting the path to deliverance of the devotees of īśvara;” see Inami & Tillemans 1986: 133f. and 140, items 166–171). Note that the word dbang denotes special rituals such as initiation.

[13]:

For the text and translation, see the Appendix.

[14]:

See, in particular, PV II.34–53. For a study and English translation of the text, see Franco 1997, chapter 4 and pp. 159–258, and Taber 2003.

[15]:

See Pecchia 2015: 26–28. Franco 1997: 71ff. provides some considerations on karma in relation with rebirth in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter.

[16]:

See Heim 2013 for a comprehensive study of cetanā as presented in relevant Pāli sources.

[17]:

“It is volition (cetanā), monks, that I call karma. Having willed (cetayitvā), one performs an action (kammaṃ karoti) by body, by speech, by mind” (Harvey 2011: 182).

[18]:

As observed by D. Keown, saṃskāras “designate the transformative effect that moral action has upon the character of the agent” and “Phalas (referred to in Buddhism as karma-vipāka) denote not the end product of a transpersonal causal chain but the effect of saṃskāric change as experienced by the actor” (Keown 1996: 336f.). Dharmakīrti’s text can be taken as evidence for Keown’s statement that “a coherent account of karma can be given purely in terms of saṃskāras” (ibid., p. 337).

[19]:

See Eltschinger 2014: 125ff. for a consideration of the mention of tantric works in the Svārthānumāna chapter of the PV, and Bisschop 2010: 483–486 for some considerations about the presence of the Pāśupata movement around the middle of the first millennium.

[20]:

On these kārikās see Pecchia 2015: 148–153 and the respective sections in Part 3,”Comments upon the Kārikās...”.

[21]:

See Niśvāsa, pp. 40f., and Acharya 2014: 10f.

[22]:

Sanderson 1992: 285f.

[23]:

SvaTU 73.10–13: tad atra dīkṣāyām eva pratyavatiṣṭhante saugatāḥ–iha dīkṣayā kim ātmanaḥ saṃ-skāraḥ kriyate buddher vā? kim ātmagrahādīnāṃ malānāṃ, kiṃ vā karmaṇām?

[24]:

SvaTU 76.4–10: ayam ātmā … āṇavena malena … kārmeṇa … māyākhyena malena ca valitaḥ.

[25]:

Sironi’s Italian translation of dhaṭadīkṣā° (SvaTU 75.17) with “iniziazione del vaso” (1988: 93) seems to presuppose the reading ghaṭadīkṣā°, because “vaso” (in English “pot”) is a usual translation of ghaṭa. However, the reading ghaṭa is problematic in the present SvaTU context and might be due to an oversight. An analogous oversight might have caused Sironi’s translations of dhaṭaśuddhivat and dhaṭavat (SvaTU 81.4 and 7) with “come quando si pulisce un vaso” and “così come accade di un vaso,” respectively (Sironi 1988: 97). With regard to the latter passage Sironi explicitly states that she reads ghaṭa°, and not dhaṭa°, by saying that she emends the edited text ghaṭataḥ to ghaṭavat (Sironi 1988: 97, n. 37).

[26]:

SvaTU 77.7f.: tat teṣām eva upahāsyatām āviṣkaroti.

[27]:

SvaTU 77.13f.: acintyaprabhāvatvāt teṣāṃ pāśapraśamane’pi sāmarthyaṃ kiṃ na sahyate.

[28]:

SvaTU 78.1–5: yathā hi virūpasya vairūpyam anivartyāpi lokottararamaṇīvaśīkaraṇaṃ mantraiḥ kriyate, tadvad dehārambhikarmāśodhanāt vartamānadehe rāgādyanivṛttav api bhāviprarohapratirodhanaṃ pāśānāṃ kurvatāṃ mantrāṇāṃ kim āyātam.

[29]:

TĀ 20.1: atha dīkṣāṃ bruve mūḍhajanāśvāsapradāyinīm. Italian translation in Gnoli 1999: 458.

[30]:

SvaTU 76.1f.: tasmāt kṣaṇikatvādibhāvanāpūrvikā nairātmyadṛṣṭir eva mokṣa iti.

[31]:

See Sanderson 1988: 700.

[32]:

Attilia Sironi, assisted by Raniero Gnoli, has published an Italian translation of the Uddyota passage here under consideration and the relevant part of the PV (Sironi 1988).

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