Text 85: On Number (Saṃkhyā)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 85:

एकादिव्यवहारहेतुः संख्या । सा पुनरेकद्रव्या चानेकद्रव्या च । तत्रैकद्रव्यायाः सलिलादिपरमाणुरूपदीनामिव नित्यानित्यत्वनिष्पत्तयः । अनेकद्रव्या तु द्वित्वादिका परार्धान्ता । तस्याः खल्वेकत्वेभ्योऽनेकविषयबुद्धिसहितेभ्यो निष्पत्तिरपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशाद्विनाश इति । कथम् । यदा बोद्धुश्चक्षुषा समानासमानजातीययोर्द्रव्ययोः सन्निकर्षे सति तत्सम्युक्तसमवेतसमवेतैकत्वसामान्यज्ञानोत्पत्तावेकत्वसामान्यतत्ससम्बन्धज्ञानेभ्य एकगुणयोरनेकविषयिण्येका बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तदा तामप्क्ष्यैकत्वाभ्यां स्वाश्रययोर्द्वित्वम् आरम्भ्यते ततः पुनस्तस्मिन् द्वित्वसामान्यज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तस्माद्द्वित्वसामान्यज्ञानादपेक्षाबुद्धेर्विनश्यत्ता द्वित्वसामान्यतत्सम्बन्धतज्ज्ञानेभ्यो द्वित्वगुणबुद्धेरुत्पद्यमानतेत्येकः कालः । तत इदानीमपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशाद् द्वित्वगुणस्य विनश्यत्ता द्वित्वगुणज्ञानं द्वित्वसामान्यज्ञानस्य विनाशकारणं द्वित्वगुणतज्ज्ञानसम्बन्धेभ्यो द्वे द्रव्ये इति द्रव्यबुद्धेरुत्पद्यमानतेत्येकः कालः । तदनन्तरं द्वे द्रव्ये इति द्रव्यज्ञानस्योत्पादः द्वित्वस्य विनाशः द्वित्वगुणबुद्धेर्विनश्यत् ता द्रव्यज्ञानात् संस्कारस्योत्पद्यमानतेत्येकः कालः तदनन्तरं द्रव्यज्ञानाद् द्वित्वगुणबुद्धेर्विनाशो द्रव्यबुद्धेरपि संस्कारात् । एतेन त्रित्वाद्युत्पत्तिरपि व्याख्याता । एकत्वेभ्योऽनेकविषयबुद्धिसहितेभ्यो निष्पत्तिरपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशाच्च विनाश इति । क्वचिच्चाश्रयविनाशादिति । कथम् । यदैकत्वाधारावयवे कर्मोत्पद्यते तदैवैकत्वसामान्यज्ञानमुत्पद्यते कर्मणा चावयवान्तराद्विभागः क्रियते अपेक्षाबुद्धेश्चोत्पत्तिः । ततो यस्मिन्नेव काले विभागात् सम्योगविनाशस्तस्मिन्नेव काले द्वित्वमुत्पद्यते सम्योगविनाशाद् द्रव्यविनाशः सामान्यबुद्धेश्चोत्पत्तिः । ततो यस्मिन्नेव काले सामान्यज्ञानादपेक्षाबुद्धेर्विनाशः तस्मिन्नेव काले आश्रयविनाशाद् द्वित्वविनाश इति शोभनमेतद्विधानं बध्यघातकपक्षे सहानवस्थानलक्षणे तु विरोधे द्रव्यज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः । कथम् । गुणबुद्धिसमकालमपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशाद् द्वित्वविनाशे तदपेक्षस्य द्वे द्रव्ये इति द्रव्यज्ञानस्यानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति । लैङ्गिकवज्ज्ञानमात्रादिति चेतस्यान्मतं यथाऽभूतम् भूतस्येत्यत्र लिङ्गाभावेऽपि ज्ञानमात्रादनुमानं तथा गुणविनाशेऽपि गुणबुद्धिमात्राद् द्रव्यप्रत्ययः स्यादिति । न । विशेष्यज्ञानत्वात् । नहि विशेष्यज्ञानं सारूप्याद्विशेषणसम्बन्धमन्तरेण भवितुमर्हति । तथा चाह सूत्रकारः समवायिनः श्वैत्याच्छ्वैत्यबुद्धेः श्वेते बुद्धिस्ते कार्यकारणभूते इति । न तु लैङ्गिकं ज्ञानमभेदेनोत्पद्यते तस्माद्विषमोऽयमुपन्यासः न आशूत्पत्तेः यथा शब्दवदाकाशमिति अत्र त्रीणि ज्ञानान्याशूत्पद्यन्ते तथा द्वित्वादिज्ञनोत्पत्तावित्यदोषः । बध्यघातकपक्षेऽपि समानो दोष इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् । ननु बध्यघातकपक्षेऽपि तर्हि द्रव्यज्ञानानुत्पत्ति प्रसङ्गः । कथम् । द्वित्वसामान्यबुद्धिसमकालं संस्कारादपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशाद् इति । न । समूहज्ञानस्य संस्कारहेतुत्वात् समूहज्ञान्मेव संस्कारकारणं नालोचनज्ञानमित्यदोषः । ज्ञानयौगपद्यप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् स्यान्मतम् ननु ज्ञानानां बध्यघातकविरोधे ज्ञानयौगपद्यप्रसङ्ग इति । न । अविनश्यतोरवस्थानप्रतिषेधात् । ज्ञानायौगप्द्यवचनेन ज्ञानयोर्युगपदुत्पत्तिरविनश्यतोश्च युगपदवस्थानं प्रतिषिध्यते नहि बध्यघातकविरोधे ज्ञानयोर्युगपदुत्पत्तिर्विनश्यतोश्च युगपदवस्थानमस्तीति ॥ ८५ ॥

ekādivyavahārahetuḥ saṃkhyā | sā punarekadravyā cānekadravyā ca | tatraikadravyāyāḥ salilādiparamāṇurūpadīnāmiva nityānityatvaniṣpattayaḥ | anekadravyā tu dvitvādikā parārdhāntā | tasyāḥ khalvekatvebhyo'nekaviṣayabuddhisahitebhyo niṣpattirapekṣābuddhivināśādvināśa iti | katham | yadā boddhuścakṣuṣā samānāsamānajātīyayordravyayoḥ sannikarṣe sati tatsamyuktasamavetasamavetaikatvasāmānyajñānotpattāvekatvasāmānyatatsasambandhajñānebhya ekaguṇayoranekaviṣayiṇyekā buddhirutpadyate tadā tāmapkṣyaikatvābhyāṃ svāśrayayordvitvam ārambhyate tataḥ punastasmin dvitvasāmānyajñānamutpadyate tasmāddvitvasāmānyajñānādapekṣābuddhervinaśyattā dvitvasāmānyatatsambandhatajjñānebhyo dvitvaguṇabuddherutpadyamānatetyekaḥ kālaḥ | tata idānīmapekṣābuddhivināśād dvitvaguṇasya vinaśyattā dvitvaguṇajñānaṃ dvitvasāmānyajñānasya vināśakāraṇaṃ dvitvaguṇatajjñānasambandhebhyo dve dravye iti dravyabuddherutpadyamānatetyekaḥ kālaḥ | tadanantaraṃ dve dravye iti dravyajñānasyotpādaḥ dvitvasya vināśaḥ dvitvaguṇabuddhervinaśyat tā dravyajñānāt saṃskārasyotpadyamānatetyekaḥ kālaḥ tadanantaraṃ dravyajñānād dvitvaguṇabuddhervināśo dravyabuddherapi saṃskārāt | etena tritvādyutpattirapi vyākhyātā | ekatvebhyo'nekaviṣayabuddhisahitebhyo niṣpattirapekṣābuddhivināśācca vināśa iti | kvaciccāśrayavināśāditi | katham | yadaikatvādhārāvayave karmotpadyate tadaivaikatvasāmānyajñānamutpadyate karmaṇā cāvayavāntarādvibhāgaḥ kriyate apekṣābuddheścotpattiḥ | tato yasminneva kāle vibhāgāt samyogavināśastasminneva kāle dvitvamutpadyate samyogavināśād dravyavināśaḥ sāmānyabuddheścotpattiḥ | tato yasminneva kāle sāmānyajñānādapekṣābuddhervināśaḥ tasminneva kāle āśrayavināśād dvitvavināśa iti śobhanametadvidhānaṃ badhyaghātakapakṣe sahānavasthānalakṣaṇe tu virodhe dravyajñānānutpattiprasaṅgaḥ | katham | guṇabuddhisamakālamapekṣābuddhivināśād dvitvavināśe tadapekṣasya dve dravye iti dravyajñānasyānutpattiprasaṅga iti | laiṅgikavajjñānamātrāditi cetasyānmataṃ yathā'bhūtam bhūtasyetyatra liṅgābhāve'pi jñānamātrādanumānaṃ tathā guṇavināśe'pi guṇabuddhimātrād dravyapratyayaḥ syāditi | na | viśeṣyajñānatvāt | nahi viśeṣyajñānaṃ sārūpyādviśeṣaṇasambandhamantareṇa bhavitumarhati | tathā cāha sūtrakāraḥ samavāyinaḥ śvaityācchvaityabuddheḥ śvete buddhiste kāryakāraṇabhūte iti | na tu laiṅgikaṃ jñānamabhedenotpadyate tasmādviṣamo'yamupanyāsaḥ na āśūtpatteḥ yathā śabdavadākāśamiti atra trīṇi jñānānyāśūtpadyante tathā dvitvādijñanotpattāvityadoṣaḥ | badhyaghātakapakṣe'pi samāno doṣa iti cet syānmatam | nanu badhyaghātakapakṣe'pi tarhi dravyajñānānutpatti prasaṅgaḥ | katham | dvitvasāmānyabuddhisamakālaṃ saṃskārādapekṣābuddhivināśād iti | na | samūhajñānasya saṃskārahetutvāt samūhajñānmeva saṃskārakāraṇaṃ nālocanajñānamityadoṣaḥ | jñānayaugapadyaprasaṅga iti cet syānmatam nanu jñānānāṃ badhyaghātakavirodhe jñānayaugapadyaprasaṅga iti | na | avinaśyatoravasthānapratiṣedhāt | jñānāyaugapdyavacanena jñānayoryugapadutpattiravinaśyatośca yugapadavasthānaṃ pratiṣidhyate nahi badhyaghātakavirodhe jñānayoryugapadutpattirvinaśyatośca yugapadavasthānamastīti || 85 ||

Text (85).—Number forms the basis of such usages as ‘one’ and the rest. It inheres in one and in many substances. The number inhering in one substance has its eternal and transient manifestations in the same manner as those of the colour &c. of the atom of water and the rest. The number inhering in many substances begins with ‘Two’ and ends with ‘Parārdha’ (100,000,000,000,000,000). This number proceeds from many unities as accompanied by the ideas of more than one object, and is destroyed by the disappearance of all distinctive notions (of one object as distinct from another). To explain: when the eye of the cognising person is in contact with two substances, be these either homogeneous or heterogeneous, then there arises a notion of unity subsisting in the quality of singleness which exists in each of the objects that are in contact with the Eye; and then there appears the single idea of the two singlenesses subsisting in the two objects,—this idea proceeding from the [?]notions of the genus ‘unity’ and its relationships {to the objects in question). Then with regard to this idea, these two singlenesses bring about the Duality of their substrates; and with reference to this Duality, there appears the generic idea of ‘Duality’. This generic idea of ‘Duality’ leads to the destruction of the distinctive notion (with regard to each of the two substances taken individually); and simultaneously with this destruction there appears the idea of the quality of Duality, proceeding from the generic ‘duality’, its relationship, and its cognition. Then the disappearance of the distinctive notions (of each of the substances) leads to the destruction of the quality of Duality; as the notion of the quality of Duality is the cause of the destruction of the generic idea of ‘Duality; and simultaneously with this destruction of the quality of Duality, there arises the idea of the substances, as ‘two substances’ out of the quality of Duality, its cognition and its relationship. Then there arises the actual cognition of Substance, as ‘two substances’ and the disappearance of Duality, which leads to the idea of Duality as a quality; and simultaneously with this there arises this impression out of the cognition of the Substance. Then from the cognition of the Substance there follows the destraction of the idea of Duality as quality; and that of the idea of Substance also, from the Impression (left by the previous conceptions).

The same process would also apply to the case of the notions of “three” and the rest. As these also proceed out of unities as accompanied by the idea of many substances; and disappear on the disappearance of the distinctive conception of each object.

In certain cases these notions (of ‘Duality’ dec.) are destroyed by the destruction of the substrates themselves. To explain:—When a certain action has commenced in that particle which is the substratum of unity, and there arises a generic idea of ‘unity’, the said action serves to disjoin that particle from the other particle, whence there the distinctive idea (of each of the particles). Hence, at the very time that there is a destruction of Conjunction by the said Disjunction, there appears Duality, and the destruction of Conjunction leads to the destruction of the object (as a whole), and the appearance of the generic idea. At the very time that the generic idea destroys the distinctive idea, it is only natural that there should be a destruction of Duality, on account of the destruction of its very substrate.

All this is quite compatible with the theory that whenever an idea appears it always destroys the idea that preceded it. In case however the incompatibility between two ideas consisted merely in the improbability of their coexistence, there would be no appearance of the cognition of the Substance. Because the distinctive idea having been destroyed simultaneously with the idea of quality, and leading to the destruction of Duality, there would be no possibility of any such cognition of Substance as ‘two substances’.

Objection.—“As in the case of inferential cognition, so here also (we would have the cognition of the substance) from mere cognition. That is to say, it has been explained under the Sūtra ‘Abhūtam bhūtasya’ (III-i-11) that in certain cases we have inferential knowledge, even in the absence of a definite Middle Term, from mere cognition; in the same manner, in the case in question, even though the quality (Duality) may have been destroyed, yet from the mere cognition of that quality there would proceed the cognition of the Substance (as ‘two substances’).”

Reply: Not so; because the cognition in question is of the Substance as qualified (by Duality); and in as much as the qualification enters into the very essence of the qualified object, there could be no cognition of the latter without some connection with the qualification. This is what has been declared by the author of the sūtra, under VIII-i-9:—‘The cognition of the white object proceeds from the cognition of the whiteness inhering in that object; and these same stand in the relation of cause and effect.’ The case of inferential knowledge is different, as in that the knowledge produced is not such as makes the subject of the conclusion identical (with the mark or Middle Term.). It cannot be argued that at the time of the cognition of the substance there is no actual destruction of the idea of the quality (of duality) because of extremely quick appearance. That is to say, just as in the case of the notion ‘the Ākāśa (1) is endowed (2) with sound (3)’ we find three distinct cognitions appearing quickly one after the other, so could it as reasonably be in the case of the appearance of the cognition; of Duality &c., (i.e., in the cognition ‘two substances,’ the idea of ‘substance’ appears after that of ‘two’ has disappeared; but it appears so quickly upon the wake of the other, that the sequence is scarcely perceptible, and gives rise to the idea that the two are simultaneous).

Objection: “The objection that you bring forward would, apply equally in the case of your own theory of one cognition destroying another. That is to say, in that case also, there would be no cogition of the Substance. Because simultaneously with the generic idea of ‘duality,’ then appears the Impression, which destroys all distinctive idea.”

Reply: Not so; because what brings about the impression is ths collective post-cognition (of all the factors concerned) and not the mere perceptive cognition (which alone is held to disappear as soon as it is produced). Consequently the said objection (of the impossibility of the cognition of Substance) cannot apply to our theory.

Objection: “In that case there would be a simultaneity of cognitions, if the incompatibility of cognitions consisted in the fact of one of them being the destroyer of another.”

Reply: Not so; because what is denied by the Sūtra. (‘jñānāyaugapadyāt’) is the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two such cognitions as do not destroy each other; that is to say, what is denied is the idea that two cognitions can appear simultaneously and that they can coexist, without the one destroying the other; and in the case of the theory of one cognition being the destroyer of another, there is no possibility either of the simultaneous appearance of two cognitions, or of the coexistence of these, without the one destroying the other. (Hence this theory is quite in keeping with the declaration of the ‘non-simultaneity of cognitions’).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Though the form and existence of Number are well-known, yet there are some people whose intellects are clouded by utterly mistaken views, and who deny its existence. And it is with a view to these that the author says ekādi &c., ‘Vyavahāra’ may be taken as equivalent to ‘vyavahṛti’, ‘Use’ ‘knowledge of what is to be known;’ and it may also be taken as ‘vyavahriyate anena,’ ‘that by means of which usage is carried on,’ i.e., the word expressing the idea. Hence the word ‘Ekādivyavahāra’ would mean the idea or knowledge as well as the words, of ‘eka’, ‘one’ and the rest; and the basis of this is what is called ‘number.’ The argument may be thus stated: The idea of ‘one’ &c, is due to a qualification, because it is a qualified idea, like the idea of ‘the man with the j stick.’ In the same manner, we can substitute ‘word’ for ‘idea’ in this same argument; and the reason would be stated in the form ‘because it is a qualified word.’

Objection:—“The ideas in question are only ideas of Colour and such other properties, (and not of any distinct quality in the shape of Number).”

Reply:—Not so; because the ideas of ‘one’ &c., are found to be totally different from those of Colour &c. That is to say; the ideas of Colour are in the forms of ‘blue,’ ‘yellow’ &c., and not in those of ‘one,’ ‘two’ &c.

Objection:—“ Then we may regard these ideas to have no corresponding substratum; and we do not know of any objects apart from these, Colour &c.

Reply:—We ask—Whence then come the specific forms of ‘one’ ‘two’ &c.,?

Objection:—“They are due to the fruition of the Vāsanā (Tendencies or Impressions) encased in the Ālayavijñānas, or Receptive Consciousness of the person having those ideas.”

Reply:—In that case we may attribute the ideas of ‘Blue’ &c., also to the same source; for we do not perceive any difference between the blue, yellow &c., on the one hand, and one,’ two’ &c., on the other,—as forming objects of cognition; and hence we can have no grounds for believing the one to be based upon a real substratum, and the other to have no a such substratum.

Objection.—“There is this difference between the two: While the form of ‘blue’ is real, that of ‘number’ is unreal and mistaken.”

Reply:—There is not much in this argument; as there are no grounds for believing the form of blue also to be real; as there can be no corroboration of any such idea; as that particular form belongs (according to you) to that idea alone, and lasts a single moment (and as such it does not stay long enough to be corroborated). For the same reason, no effective action could belong to such a form. Nor do we ever recognise any similarity between the form of one idea which is restricted to that idea alone, and those of other ideas; and hence it is not possible to have the necessary corroboration based upon such similarity; specially as in all cases we do not always perceive similar forms; there are many instances of our perceiving forms that are not similar at all.

Nor again, can the unmistaken character of ‘form of blue’ be said to be due to its being born of an ‘object’; because so long as the object itself is not duly cognised,—there can be no certainty of its being born of an ‘object’; and if the object were to be cognised by other means of knowledge, then the assumption of a ‘form’ from another source would be absolutely useless; and if the object were held to be established from the cognition of the ‘form’ alone, then, in that case, the object could be accomplished on the strength of the cognition of the unmistaken form, and the fact of this cognition being born of or based upon the object would be dependent upon the accomplishment of the ‘object,’—and this would involve a most undesirable interdependence.

As for not being set aside, this belongs to the blueform, as well as to the form of number, as imprinted upon the cognition. Any setting aside would be impossible, as regards the object itself (this setting aside being of the cognition alone); and as such it could never be conceived of with regard to the blue colour itself, as all such Colours are very far removed from the cognition,—between which and the Colour there is the intervening form (of the Colour). Hence it is that in all eases what, is cognised is one form, (or shape). And because any one cognition might be found to have originated from a non-object (i.e., an object having no real existence) it does not necessarily follow that all other cognitions are the same. Thus then the real existence of the Blue &c., could not be proved.

Objection:—“There being no external object, the fruition, or development, of the tendencies (bhāvanā) would be dependent solely upon their own series (santāna); and as such there would be no restriction as to their appearence only at certain times, and not at all times; and hence the blue-form, itself which (according to the Idealist) depends upon these same developments (in the form of cognitions), would not have any such restriction; and this would justify the assumption of the Blue &c.”

Reply:—If the forms of one, two &c„ did not depend upon external objects, there could be no restriction as to their being cognised only at certain times; and hence it would be necessary to assume the existence of Number also; as the reasons for such assumption in this case are exactly the same as those in the case of Blue &c.

Some people have held that Number has no existence apart from Substances. But this is not right. Because in the case of a number of trees close to one another, seen from a distance,—even though their oneness &c., are not perceived,—their shape is distinctly perceived (and Number is nothing different from these shapes perceived as distinct). It would also be perceived along with a real existence. This same argument would also prove the fact of Number being something distinct from the Substance; even when we cannot see the Colour, we distinctly see the object as a substance.

The form of Number having thus been proved to have real existence, the author proceeds to describe its various kinds Sā punaḥ &c. ‘Ekadravya’ is that number which inheres in a single substance; ‘anekadravyā’ is that inhering in substances more than one; the particle ‘ca’ serves to indicate that these two are the only kinds of members.

Out of these two, the number belonging to one Substance may be shown to be eternal and non-eternal, in the same manner as the Colour &c., of the atoms of water &c. That is to say, just as in the water-atoms, Colour, Taste and Touch are eternal, so also is the number ‘One’ (belonging to such an atom); and just as the Colour &c., of aqueous products are non-eternal, being destroyed at the destruction of their substratum, and being produced in accordance with the Colour &c., of the originative aqueous substance,—so also is the number ‘one’ (as belonging to such products).

The number inhering in more than one substance includes all numbers from two to the highest conceivable number. ‘Parārdha’ is that at which all limitation of number ceases. The particle ‘tu’ is added with a view to show that ‘duality’ differs from ‘unity’ in point of belonging to more than one substance.

This second sort of number is not a mere aggregate of the quality of many unities; it is produced out of many unities as accompanied by the notion of many objects; and it disappears on the destruction of the ‘distinctive notions.’ ‘Khalu,’ is meant to lend force to the declaration. We must explain ‘ekatvebhyaḥ’ as equivalent to ‘ektave ca, ekatvāni ca, tebhyaḥ’; otherwise the assertion would not include the origin of duality (which proceeds from two unities only, which would be expressed by the word ‘ekatve’ and not by ‘ekatvāni’) So also, in the clause, accompanied by the notion of many objects, the word ‘aneka’ must be taken in this literal sense of ‘not one,’ as applying to two as well as to more than two.

The author now proceeds to prove the aforesaid assertion by means of a discussion, beginning with the question “How?”

At the time that there is a direct contact of the perceiver’s eye with, two like things, as two jars, or with two unlike things, like the jar and a piece of cloth,—then there arises a knowledge of the unity inhering in the two unities belonging to the two objects; as the knowledge of the qualified object is always brought about by the knowledge of the qualifications; and ‘unity’ is the qualification of the properties of the two units; we take into consideration the knowledge of the singleness. But a visual cognition is never possible without proximity; and hence we have shown that unity is related to the sense-organ (of vision) by the relationship of inherence in that (unit) which inheres in the thing (jar) which is in direct contact with the organ.

The knowledge of ‘unity’ having thus been produced, that singleness becomes related to the two qualifying unities; and from the said knowledge there follows a single idea with regard to the two qualifying unities; the organ (in the case of visual perception) is one only, because of the impossibility of both Eyes being simultaneously enlivened by the internal organ; and thus in all cases, the perceiving being done by one organ only, the presence of another eye would be wholly useless. Consequently it is held that the two eyes together constitute the organ of vision; and in all cases of visual perception, it is from both eyes that rays of light proceed; these rays of light come into contact with the object perceived; in the same way as the rays of light emanating from a lamp in the house strike the outside object through two apertures in the wall. What is enlivened and guided by the Internal Organ is the Visual Organ directly by itself, and not through its relationship with the object; as the Internal Organ never moves out of the body; and as such it gives rise to the cognition only by means of its relationships established through the Visual Organ. And thus it becomes possible, through the power of the causes of perception, to have a simultaneous cognition of more than one object. Though the power or potency of the causes is such, yet it gives rise to only one cognition at a time; because the contact of the Soul and the Internal Organ (which is a necessary element in the cause of cognition) is capable of producing a single cognition at a time.

It is on account of this fact, that we have ‘determinate’ or ‘concrete’ cognitions as well as ‘non-determinate’ or ‘abstract’ ones; because there come up, in such cases, a number of impressions of several objects of verbal conventions; these impressions becoming operative give rise to certain remembrances; and then through the force of the contact of the Soul and the Internal Organ, there appears a single cognition accompanied by the remembrance of several objects.

Question: “Granted that there has appeared a single idea with regard to several qualities;—what then?”

Answer: Then on the basis of this idea, the two unities the qualities of ‘one,’ produce, in their substrate, duality. In this, the two substrata constitute the material, and the two qualities of ‘one’ the immaterial, and the idea of several objects, the instrumental or efficient, cause.

When there appears a single idea with regard to the two qualities of ‘one,’ then the two unities produce duality,— this is spoken of as constituting one point of time viz. the ‘lava’ made up of two moments or ‘Kṣaṇas.' If we calculated in terms of the moment alone, then the time involved in the production of duality could not be spoken of as one; as the cause (the ideas of two unities) and its effect (the duality) appear at distinct moments.

Nor is there anything very uncommon in the production of an object (duality) from an idea (of two unities); because we find such objects as pleasure and pain proceeding from ideas. Nor can it be rightly argued that we have never found, any external object being produced by Ideas. Because whether the effect is internal or external is a mere minor detail; the fact of being invariably concomitant with Ideas is common to both cases (of internal and external effects).

Objection: “It having been fully established that Duality is manifested by the substratum of the two qualities (of unity), it could not be proved that Idea is the immediate antecedent (cause) of that (duality).”

Reply: Not so; because that would lead to an absence of all restrictions. That is to say, if Duality were not born of Ideas, then, like Colour &c., it could be perceived by other persons also, as there would be no restricting cause; whereas when it is born of Ideas, it can be perceived by that person alone by whose ideas it is produced. The argument may be stated in this syllogistic form:—Duality is born of ideas,—because it is always cognised by a single person—that which is always cognised by a single person is always born of ideas e.g. Pleasure &c.,—Duality is always cognised by a single person,—hence it must be born of idea.

The production of Duality having been explained, the author next proceeds to describe the means of cognising it—Tataḥ punaḥ &c. i.e. after the production of Duality, there arises a cognition of Duality in general (i.e. the generic form of Duality). Herein also the cause of cognition lies in the inherence of something inhering in a thing that is in contact (with the cognitive organ). The expression ‘punaḥ’ has been added with a view to distinguish ‘Duality’ from ‘Unity’ in general. The generality ‘Duality’ is a qualification of the quality of Duality; and so long as the qualification is not cognised, there can be no cognition of the qualified. It is for this reason,—for the purpose of explaining the means of cognising the qualified (quality of Duality),—that the author has begun with pointing out the means of cognising the qualification, the generality ‘Duality.’ That this generality exists is also evidenced by the idea of ‘Duality’ qualified by the idea of the generality ‘Duality’; and the idea of Duality again is proved by the idea that we have in the form ‘two objects’ The argument may be thus stated:—The idea of ‘two objects’ is preceded by the idea of the qualification Duality,—because it is an idea of a qualified thing,—like the idea ‘man with the stick.’ And the idea of the qualification having been thus inferred, the idea also being in its turn found to be one of a qualified thing (the quality of Duality as qualified by the generality of ‘Duality’), comes to be inferred as being preceded by the idea of that qualification.

Some people hold that both the qualification and the qualified form the substrates of a single idea. But, say others, what would these people say with regard to the case of the idea of ‘fragrant sandal-wood’? For certainly the Eye (organ of visual cognition) cannot comprehend odour (fragrance); and the nose (the organ of odour-perception) cannot see the object (sandal wood); and hence these two organs cannot be accepted as comprehending or perceiving the relationship between fragrance and the sandal-wood, as the perception of relationship would depend upon the perception of the two factors related. As for instance, direct perception of recognition, produced by senseaction and Impression (respectively) is found to pertain to the past and the present, simply on account of the power of the two causes (Sense-action and Impression).- In the same manner, the cognition ‘fragrant sandalwood’ must be regarded as brought about by the joint action of the Eye and the Nose; and the fact of its pertaining to two objects (odour and sandalwood) is due to the power of the two sense-organs.

This however is not quite right; as a Cognition or Idea is not a thing made up of parts; if the Idea were something made up of several parts, then alone could there be any possibility of one part of it being produced by the Nose and another by the Eye. As it is however, the Cognition is one impartite whole, sensed by means of the two organs, and comprehending the odour as well as the substance possessing the odour. From this it would follow that the odour is cognisable by the Eye, and the substance by the Nose; for the simple reason that the cognisability of a thing by an organ depends solely upon the fact of that thing being the object of cognition produced by that organ. But the Mind being atomic, it could not operate upon two sense-organs at one and the same time. Hence it must be admitted that what occurs in the case in question is that the odour is at first perceived by the Nose; and then what the Eye does is to bring about the cognition only of the substance qualified by that odour; and thereby it aids the previous cognition of the odour. This must be admitted by all disputants, whether they like it or not.

Such then being the case, with regard to all cognitions of qualified things, we may lay down the following principle: ‘The cognition of the qualified thing in question refers to the qualified thing alone (and not to the qualification),—because it is a cognition of the qualified thing, obtained by means of the senses,—like the cognition of the ‘fragrant sandal-wood?’ We have added the qualification ‘obtained by means of the senses’ in order to exclude inferential knowledge.

Objection: “If the mere form of the substance be the substratum of the cognition of a qualified thing, then such a cognition could be possible even when there would be no qualification. It might be argued that, in as much as the qualification would be the originative cause of the cognition in question, the said contingency of the cognition of the qualified thing appearing in the absence of qualifications would not be possible. But in. any case the cognition of the qualified substance would not differ from that of the substance itself independently of the qualification, because when there would be no difference in the objects cognised, there could be none in the cognition.

Reply:—All this is not possible; because we do not admit of the supposition you put forward. That is to say, we do not hold that the cognition of the qualified thing has for its substratum the form of the thing alone; what we hold to be that substratum is the qualified thing; and certainly the character of being qualified is something distinct from the mere form of the thing; for instance, in the case of the idea of ‘man wielding a stick’, what is cognised is not the form of the man alone, nor the mere presence of the stick; but a man differing from other men; and this difference lying only in the fact of his carrying a stick. It is for this reason that the qualification is called the ‘differentia’ (that which differentiates); for instance the stick bringing about the cognition of its subserviency (or belonging) to the man, serves to differentiate him from other men. It is in this point that lies the difference of the viśeṣaṇa (Differentia, Inseparable or Inherent Property) from the upalakṣaṇa (‘some feature purely accidental’). This latter also serves to distinguish the object to which it belongs, but it does not bring about the cognition of its own subserviency. For instance, in the case of the word ‘daṇḍin’ (man with the stick) the idea produced is that of the stick being subservient to the man; but in the case of the expression ‘jaṭābhistāpasaḥ’ (the ascetic marked by the matted locks), the presence of the locks is not recognised as necessarily subservient to the ascetic. What is meant by the subserviency of the stick is that the ‘man is the predominating factor’; in view of his effective actions, wherefrom the fruits of experiences accrue to him.

Objection: “In that case the character of the qualification and the qualified is not absolute, but only relative.”

Reply: Not so; do not you know that the character of the Agent and the Instrument also is absolute as well as relative? All this we have explained in detail in the Saṅgrahaṭīkā.’

Dvitvasāmānyajñanāt apekṣā-buddhervinaśyattā, By apekṣābuddhi is meant the cognition of the two Unities; and this cognition is destructible by the knowledge of the generality of ‘Duality’; i.e. the cognition is brought into contact with its destructive cause by this generality. And in as much as this generality is related to the quality of duality, and is cognised as along with this quality, from it originates the cognition of the quality of duality; which is brought into close proximity with its productive cause by that generality.

Thus the cognition of the generality of ‘Duality’ is destructive of the Apekṣā-buddhi and productive of the cognition of the quality of Duality,—both of these, the destruction and the production, being simultaneous.

Thus then, the destruction of Apekṣā-buddhi becomes the cause of the destruction of Duality; as while the former is present, the latter is never found to exist. Hence the destruction of the Apekṣā-buddhi constitutes the destructibility of Duality. We often find a thing being destroyed by its instrumental or efficient cause; as when the last Perception of the Truth is destroyed by the destruction of the body, on the occasion of final Deliverance.

Then again, the cognition of the quality ‘Duality’ is the cause, of the destruction of the cognition of the generality ‘duality’; because one cognition is not compatible with another cognition (that is to say, two cognitions cannot coexist simultaneously). And the cognition of the quality would also be the cause of the cognition of the substance to which the quality belongs. And thus the appearance of the cognition of the quality would mean the destruction of one cognition, and the appearance of another.

Dvitvaguṇajñānasambandhebhyaḥ—i.e. From out of (1) the quality of duality, (2) the cognition, and (3) the relationship, there follows the cognition, in the form ‘two substances’; and this appearance of the cognition of the substance means the destruction of Duality, which in its form means the destruction of the cognition of quality,—all these three occurring at one point of time. Though at the time of the appearance of the cognition of ‘two substances’ there is no Duality, yet that is its cause; and certainly there is no use in the actual continuance of the cause at the time of the production of the effect; specially as the potency of the cause lies only in its bringing about an operation tending towards the production of the effect; and hence if this has been done by the cause, what would be the use of its continuance actually at the time of the production of the effect? For it would act as the cause through its operation (even when it would have disappeared after having set up that operation). Nor would this reduce the cause to the position of the secondary cause, the real causal efficiency belonging to the said operation. Because the causal efficiency cannot be regarded to have ceased merely with the intervention of the action of that same cause. If it were so, then in a case where a man has shot an arrow, and has been immediately struck dead by a stroke from behind, the man would not be regarded as the cause of the shooting of the arrow.

After that the cognition of the substance brings about the destruction of the cognition of the quality, and appearance of the “saṃskāra” (Faculty or Impression). Then the appearance of this saṃskāra means the destruction of the cognition of the substance. And at the next moment the saṃskāra destroys the cognition of the substance. The fact of the saṃskāra being the cause of this destruction of the cognition of the substance is inferred from the said destruction appearing only when the saṃskāra is present, and never otherwise.

The above explanation of the production of Duality, holds good with regard to the production of ‘three’ &c. These also are produced out of many singlenesses accompanied by the notion of ‘many’ and destroyed by the destruction of the Apekṣābuddhi.

The same explanation may be applied to the cases of the numbers ‘hundred’and the rest also. That is to say, when each unity has been cognised by itself, these cognitions give rise to impressions in the same order as themselves; and after the last unity has been cognised, there becomes manifested an unseen potency tending to establish the usage or idea of ‘hundred’; and the contact (of sense) being one only, there appears a single remembrance of objects more than one; and then these two Apekṣābuddhis, iṇ the forms of direct cognition and indirect remembrance, produce the number ‘hundred’ in reference to their own substrate. This Number is affected by the impressions of all the substances (included in that number) and this must be regarded as perceptible directly by the senses, in as much as it forms the object of the cognition produced by the sense-organ coming into contact with the last (hundredth) substance.

Objection: “In many cases it so happens that we have the collective idea of a number (‘hundred’ for instance) after the things, to whom the number belongs have been destroyed; e.g. we have the notion—‘I have killed a hundred insects.’ In this case, how would you explain the production of the number ‘hundred’? As in this case there is no substratum wherein the number could be produced?”

Reply. In such a case the number is not produced, for want of the necessary substratum. As for the use of the word ‘hundred’, it must be regarded as secondary or figurative, just as in the case of Colour &c. Such is the explanation given by some people.

Others again hold that the idea of the number is exactly similar in both cases (i. e. when the things exist, as also when they are destroyed); and as such it is not right to take the use of the word to be secondary or figurative. Hence they told that the substratum of the number consists in the things destroyed which existed in the\past, and which are recalled by remembrances of them. It is only such things as are absolute, non-entities—like the ‘sky-flower’ and the like—which cannot serve as the required substratum. As for those that have existed in the past though they are not connected with the present time, and their forms also are not present at the time in question, yet they become the material cause of the number, by being brought over to the present by means of memory, as aided by auxiliaries, the nature of which is quite compatibly with reason. Nor would this theory entail the absurdity of the possibility of such number being produced in any and every place. Because the said assumptions are made only in accordance with (and for the purpose of explaining) directly perceptible facts (which themselves cannot be denied).

It might be argued that if the past things could be the cause (of the number), then, in as much as direct cognition would be the cause of the necessary remembrance, there would be no use of assuming a saṃskāra.

But it is not so; because the direct cognition is utterly destroyed; and as such it could not have any causal potency unless it were recalled (by means of some such agency as that of Saṃskāra); and hence for the sake of its recalling, it becomes necessary to postulate the Saṃskāra. In the case of a Word, at the time that the last letter of the word is heard, though the preceding letters have all been destroyed, yet they are recalled to memory, and as such serve as the efficient cause in the denoting of the meaning of the whole word. In the same manner, such recalled things may serve as material causes also. Then too, just as the mind aided by the Saṃskāra, has the capability of remembering external things, so, in the same manner, it must be admitted, on the ground of palpable facts, that it has the power of bringing about direct cognition. Nor would this involve the impossibility of deafness, blindness &c; because the operation of the mind depends upon the functioning of the external organs of perception.

In a case where Duality is produced with regard to two things, one of which has been totally destroyed, and which is recalled by memory,—its destruction is due to the destruction of the Apekṣābuddhi in the form of remembrance. And in the case where Duality is produced while the substratum is extant, it is destroyed, not only by the destruction of the Apekṣābuddhi itself, but, in some cases, by the destruction of the substratum also; because there can be no notion of ‘two’ when either one or both of the two objects are destroyed. This is what is meant by the assertion Kvacidāśrayavināśāt.

The author proceeds to explain this in answer to the question—‘how?’—put by an ignorant person;—Yadā &c. at the time when an action is produced in a part of the substance qualified by singleness, there arises the cognition of the generality ‘Unity’ inhering in the quality of singleness. And at the next point of time the said action separates that part from another part, and the cognition of the generality of ‘unity’ brings forth the Apekṣābuddhi; and then, at the very time that the disruption of the composite substance brings about the destruction of the conjunctive adhesion of the substance, there is produced Duality out of the Apekṣābuddhi; and the destruction of the conjunction destroys the substance, and there is produced the cognition of the generality of ‘Duality’;—all this constituting one point of time.

When the cognition of the generality of ‘Duality’ destroys the Apekṣābuddhi, then the destruction of the substratum, leads to the destruction of Duality; and the cause of this latter destruction is not the destruction of the Apekṣābuddhi; because the two are found to co-exist.

Though there is no useful purpose served by the production of Duality which is destroyed without having given rise to the idea of ‘two substances’,—yet the production of the effect is such as is sure to come about whenever there is an efficient cause, and it is not necessary that there should be a useful purpose to be served by it; and hence what we have considered is only the production of the effect (Duality).

By means of the above process of the production of Duality, it has been shown that one cognition destroys that which has gone before it; this destruction is possible only when there is an opposition between the two cognitions; and this opposition some people hold to be of the same nature as that between the killer and the killed; while others regard it to be of the nature of mere incompatibility of co-existence; and the author accepting the former view, says—Śobhanametad-vidhānan.

Etadvidhānam refers to the aforesaid process of the production of Duality. In accordance with the theory that the opposition between two cognitions is of the same nature as that between the killer and the killed,—the second cognition having been produced at the next moment destroys the cognition of the previous moment; and this is quite proper. In accordance with the other view of ‘opposition’ however, the production or appearance of one cognition would be the destruction of another cognition (the appearance of the one constituting the destruction of the other, both of which therefore would never be simultaneous); and in accordance with this view it would not be possible for the idea of ‘two substances’ to be produced; and as such this theory cannot be right. This is what the author means.

He further explains this same thing—Katham &c. In accordance with the second theory, the Apekṣābuddhi would be destroyed at the time of the appearance of Duality; and this would lead to the destructibility of Duality; and the destruction of Duality would be simultaneous with the cognition of the quality; and hence at the second moment of time there could be no production of the cognition of ‘two substances’, which requires Duality; as there would be no cause for that production.

Objection: “Laiṅgikavat &c. This is further explained Syānmatam &c. Your view appears to be that, just as in a case where the man is inferred from a particular kind of sound or voice that is heard, it is only when the distinguishing feature of the sound is known that it becomes a means of inference of the man existing at the present time, even though it is itself destroyed and does not exist at the time of the inference; and hence it is the mere idea of the distinguishing mark which, even though the ‘mark’ itself be not existent, is enough for bringing about the inferential knowledge—so also even though Duality were destroyed at the time of the Cognition of the quality, the mere idea of Duality could bring about the cognition of ‘two substances’.”

“Some people offer the following explanation: The action of rain which does not appear becomes the inferential mark of the past contact of the wind and the cloud; (and proves that the clouds have been driven adrift by the wind); and in this case even though the rain does not exist yet it is the mere idea that serves as the inferential mark.”

“But this explanation is not satisfactory; because in the case of this inference, it is not the action of rain that is the inferential mark; but it is the absence of rain which leads to the inference; and certainly this absence is present at the time; as while the thing (rain) has not been brought about its prior negation remains intact. Hence the argument that we have put forward above is what should be brought forward here.”

The above objections are answered thus:—Not so; because the cognition in question is of the Substance as qualified (by Duality). It is not a fact that the cognition of ‘two substances’ proceeds from mere cognition pure and simple; because, as a matter of fact, the cognition involves the idea of the Substance also. Another question:—“Even granting that the cognition is that of the Substance, why cannot the cognition in question; be regarded as proceeding from the mere cognition (independently of the substance.)?” The answer to this is—It is not &c. The sense is that the qualification constitutes the very form of that which it qualifies; it is the very source of the idea of its own subserviency to that thing which it qualifies; and that which does not exist cannot qualify another thing; as that which does not exist cannot be the source of any idea; consequently no cognition of the qualified thing can be possible without its involving the cognition of the qualification also. The author adds the corroboration of Kaṇāda to his interpretation:—This, is what has been declared &c. Kaṇāda has declared that the cognition of the ‘white object’ proceeds from the cognition of the whiteness inhering in that object; and that for this reason there is the relation of cause and effect between the cognition of the qualification and that of the qualified object; and this causal relation cannot subsist between non-existing things; hence the qualification cannot be regarded as absolutely absent (in the cognition of what it qualifies.) By the particle ‘tu’ the author proceeds to show the difference between inferential cognition and cognition of the qualified substance: Na tu &c. Inferential cognition conceives of the inferential ‘mark’ (middle term) as subordinate to the Major term and as such does not point to an identity between these two (as the qualified cognition does with regard to the qualification and the qualified); and hence the instance cited i« not quite appropriate. That is to say, the case of Inferential knowledge is not at all akin to the cognition of “two substances.”

Objection: “At the time of this latter cognition, even Duality does not exist; and then how could the cognition be qualified by it?”

Reply: Not so; because at the moment immediately preceding the cognition Duality does exist; and in all cases the direct cognition of Duality has for its object something existing at the previous moment and as a matter of act, immediately before the congnition of ‘two substances,’ Duality does exist; and as such it is sure to form part of the following cognition. It might be added that, just as the substance appears in the cognition of " two substances,” so also does the Duality belonging to it. Nor is it possible for the Duality to appear, if it did not exist at all; hence it must be admitted that this Duality is not destroyed, and continues to exist and form the substratum of the qualified cognition; specially as the character of such substratum consists in the fact of its appearing in the cognition. This is what is meant by—‘na, āśūtpatteḥ’—That is to say, it is not that Duality is not destroyed at the time of the substance; but what happens is that the cognition of the quality of Duality, and also the cognition of the substance, are produced so close upon each other that we are unable to notice any sequence between the two, and hence we come to think that both Duality and the substances to which it belongs, form objects of one and the same cognition; in reality however it is Duality that is cognised first, and then the substances.

The author cites a corroborative example: Yathā &c. In the idea ‘the Ākāśa has sound in it,’ there are three cognitions coming one after the other,—(1) that of sound, (2) that of Ākāśa, and (3) that of Ākāśa being qualified by the sound; and similar is the case with the cognition of Duality &c. That is to say, just as in the case of the cognition of sound &c., in as much as the cognitions follow closely upon one another, we are unable to perceive any sequence in their appearance, and come to regard them as simultaneous,—in the same manner we have in the case of the cognitions of Duality and Substance.

Some people have urged that the appearance of the cognition of the substance is not possible in accordance with the theory of one cognition destroying another; and it is with regard to this that the another raises the question: Badhyaghātakapakṣe &c. That is to say, the following argument may be urged “If the cognition of the substance do not appear on the destruction of Duality, simultaneously with the cognition of the quality, then it could not be produced, in accordance with the theory of one cognition destroying another. Because just as the Apekṣābuddhi on appearing produces Duality, so also would it produce the Impression or Faculty, ‘Saṃskāra;’ and this latter is the destroyer of that Buddhi; hence at the appearance of the Saṃskāra, and Duality, there is an appearance of the cognition of the generality of ‘Duality’; and also the production of the idea of quality, and the destruction of the Apekṣābuddhi, and the destructiblity of Duality,—all this constituting one point of time; and then at the next moment, we have the appearance of the idea of quality and the destruction of Duality; and in as much as these latter are at a distinct point of time, we could not have the cognition of ‘two substances,’ which depends upon the appearance and destruction; and hence the objection applies also to the theory of the destruction of one cognition by another.”

Reply: Na, samūhajñānasya saṃskārahetutvāt. That is to say, what produces the saṃskāra is the collective cognition of the substance qualified by the quality of Duality, and not the mere indeterminate or unqualified cognition, the Apekṣābuddhi: and hence this latter is not destroyed by the saṃskāra. The fact of the Apekṣābuddhi not being the cause of the saṃskāra is proved by the remembrance of the two unities as distinct from the substances.

Objection: “When one cognition on appearing destroys the previous cognition, then, in accordance with this view, we must have the two existing together (in order for the one to be able to destroy the other) and this would be a contradiction of the Sūtra speaking of the ‘non-simultaneity of cognitions.’ The sense of this objection is further explained—‘Syānmatam &c.,’ and then again by ‘nanu &c.’

Reply: Na &c. That is to say, there is no incongruity in the simultaneity of two such cognitions as are destructive of each other. The ‘non-simultaneity’ spoken of in the sūtra refers to such cognitions as do not destroy each other,—two such cognitions cannot exist at one and the same time. That is to say, what is meant to be denied by the mention of ‘non-simultaneity’ is the simultaneous appearance of two cognitions, and also their simultaneous existence without destroying each other. In accordance With the theory of one cognition destroying another, however, there is no simultaneous appearance of any two cognitions; nor is there simultaneous existence of any two cognitions; as soon as one appears the other at once assumes the destructible form. This is what is meant by ‘na hi &c.’ The particle ‘iti’ indicates the end of the discussion.

(A fresh Discussion is started).

Objection: “Well Sir, all this description of the process of The production &c. of Duality is wholly irrelevant; as there is no proof of the existence of Duality itself.

Question: “We have an evidence for it, in the shape of the cognition of two ‘Substances.’

“Answer: Not so; because Duality is devoid of the mark of cognisability. That is to say, any object when cognised, becomes so either as produced or as not produced; in any case the cognisability could not belong to Duality; as when it is produced it does not exist and when it is not produced it can have no continuance.

Question: ‘The object in the past is what is cognised, as it is such an object that brings about the cognition.’

“Answer: Not so; because this explanation is not compatible with the fact of all things being cognised as in the present; and also because if such were the case then the organs of sense (which are causes of the cognition) would also be cognisable or perceptible (which is not admitted).

“Question: It may be that the character of the, thing is so modified by its cause and its accessories that even though both the thing and the sense-organs are equally the cause of the cognition, yet it is only the object, and not the sense-organ, that becomes the cognised. And as for the notion of the cognised thing being in the present, that may be explained as being due to the fact of the cognition appearing immediately after the object.”

“Answer: What do you mean by this ‘cognisability’?

“It may be said that cognisability consists in being the cause of cognition.

“But in that case the sense-organs also, being the causes of cognition, would have to be regarded as cognisable.

“Objection: ‘The self-cognition of the cognition would constitute the cognisability of the other (i.e. of the object cognised).’

“Reply: It is very queer that the cognition should be of one thing (cognition), and cognisability should belong to something else (the cognised object).

“Objection: ‘There is nothing queer in this; as surely you cannot object to the nature of things. A cognition by its very nature is so constituted as to comprehend an object; and hence it is the cognising of the cognition’s own seif that constitutes the comprehension of the object; and this comprehension is “only of that object which has brought about the cognition, and of no other object; and as such there can be no irregularity.”

“Reply: Not so; because of the singleness of the object. The meaning of the cognition being arthaja, is that it is produced from it; and certainly this production is one only. And because it is a property of the cognition and the object, that “would be no reason why it could not restrict the object.

“It might be argued that, in as much as the cognition is a property of something else, it could not belong to the object. But, as a matter of fact, it is the mutual restriction or limitation of these that constitutes their relationship of the apprehender and the apprehended, and this relationship is not due to the restriction of only one of the two members related. Nor has the past or future object any causal potency towards the cognition, for the simple reason that they do not exist at the time.

“Question: ‘Cannot the relationship of the object and the cognition of that object be the basis of the relationship of the Apprehender and the Apprehended?’

“Answer: That could not be; because of non-difference; that is to say, the character of the apprehended does not in any way differ from that of being the object of the cognition, and that of the apprehender is not different from that of being the cognition of that object; and hence when we ask you the cause of the mutual limitation of these two, you name these very characters as the basis,—and certainly it passes beyond the limits of all answering intelligences.

“Question: ‘It is the very nature of cognition that it ap-prebends only certain definite things.’

“Answer: If this nature be not due to any cause then there can be no restriction of the object; and if it be due to some cause, then please tell me what this cause is; what is the use of trumpetting about the ‘nature’ of the thing? And as a matter of fact, we cannot think of any other cause save the production or appearance.

“Objection: ‘It is only that which brings about the cognition, and gives form to it, that can be apprehended by it, and nothing else. It is absolutely necessary to admit that in cognition the form is that of the object. Otherwise cognition, being of the nature of pure consciousness, without any form, could pertain equally to all things, and there could be no such specification as that this is the cognition of blue, and that the cognition of yellow; and then cognition would never afford any idea of particular things. It is for this reason that the form of the object is regarded as the evidence or authority of the cognition. And, it is this form of the object which connects the cognition with a particular object. And as the sense-organs are common factors, they cannot lead to the specification of cognitions, and as such cannot be regarded as apprehended. To this effect it has been said that, in as much as it is the form of the cognised object that connects the cognition with its object, and as it does not renounce that form of the object, it is that form alone that constitutes the evidence or authority of the cognition. of that object; and then again, we have another declaration to the effect that, the mere being of the consciousness cannot be rightly regarded as cognition; as that is a factor common to all cognitions; and it is only that which would turn the cognition into its own specific form that could impart its form to that.

“To this the following reply is made: What is it that is perceived by the cognition with a form? Is it the object, or the form of the cognition itself, or both? It could not be both; because what is apprehended is in a single form, of the ‘blue’ for instance. Nor is it right to assert that the object is cognised by the cognition; because at the time of the existence of the object in its own pure form, the cognition does not appear: and at the time of the cognition, the object having been relegated to the past, could never be apprehended as existing in the present. If it be asserted that the idea of the present that enters into the cognition pertains to the moment of time concomitant with the time of the cognition,—this would be an instance of extreme credulity and faith in your own doctrines; as the moment of time is never found to form the object of cognition. What too is the reason that a cognition brings about the apprehension of only a particular object, and not of all objects? There is no identity between the object and the cognition; nor could the appearance of the cognition be the means of the restriction,—as has already been shown above.

“Objection: The cause of restriction would lie in the feet of the cognition having the form of that particular object.’

“Reply: How is it that one moment (individual) of the blue does not apprehend another blue (the blue form being the same in both cases)?

“Objection: ‘The apprehensive potency belongs to the cog-nition alone, and not to the object.’

“Reply: Yet, any one cognition of blue would apprehend all moments (individuals) of the blue; as the blue form would be common to all.

“Even if it be argued that apprehensibility belongs only to that moment or condition of the object which brings about the cognition, and which imparts its own form to it,—then in that case, apprehensibility would belong to the sense-organ, and also to the cognition appearing immediately before it; as these two also serve to bring about the cognition; and the cognition also bears their respective similarities, in that it pertains to the apprehension of an object (thus resembling the sense-organ) and is of the nature of consciousness (thus resembling the proceeding cognition).

Objection: ‘You say that the cognition resembles the sense-organ in that it pertains to the apprehension of objects, and also the proceeding cognition, in that it is of the nature of consciousness; but both these resemblances are common to all cognitions. What is peculiar to each cognition is only the similarity that it bears to the object cognised; as the form of blue can be present only in that cognition which is produced by the blue object. And it is only that property which is peculiar to a thing that can serve as the restrictive agent. And it is on account of this that what the cognition particularly apprehends is the object, and not the sense-organs or the preceding cognition.’

“Reply: There is not much in this; as there would always be a likelihood of the apprehension of such preceding cognition as may have the same object.

“Objection: ‘That blue object which imparts to the cognition the blue form, is what is apprehended by it; and in the case of a serial cognition, the blue form of the cognition is due, not to the blue form of the preceding cognition, but to the blue object; as it is only the object with whom the appearance of the blue form is found to be invariably concomitant—always existing when it exists, and never when it does not exist; and ‘as for consciousness, it is found to have a power of bringing about a form of consciousness alone.’

“Reply: Whose commands have you received to the effect that? what is apprehensible is only that which imparts the form, blue f.i., to the cognition? If the apprehensible character of that same object were to be the means of such a restriction upon apprehensibility, then, the restriction might be taken as due to the peculiar nature of things only. As a matter of fact, it is found that when the cognition appears, it does so in the form of the cognizance of such an object as to which the auxilliaries of the cognition appertain; and the object also is cognised only in that particular form in which it is cognisable; and the sense-organ &c., are not cognised. Consequently the form of the object need not be taken as the cause of the cognition. As certainly the relation of the action of cutting to the tree is not due to the fact of that action possessing the form of the tree (that is cut); nor is it through the axe; but the fact is that the nature of the action, and also that of the tree, is such that the action is restricted to (pertains to) the tree only, and to nothing else. Then as for the restricted notion that this is the cognition of that, this is due to the character of the cognition (appearance) itself; and for the sake of this too we need not look for any form.

“It might be urged that the object is not apprehended by the cognition which has a form,—the cognition apprehending only its own form. But, in that case, there would be absolutely no proof for the existence of the object, as there would be neither the apprehension nor the determination or (ascertainment) of the fact; what would be possible would be a mere fancy of it; and though this fancy is the effect of mere imagination, yet, in as much as it follows on the wake of sense-perception, wherever we have sense-perception, there the fancy renounces its own function, and taking up the functions of the cause it renders the thing in question perceptible; but in a case where sense-perception itself is not present, the fancy also is wholly incapable; as the cause (of its functioning) is absent.

“Objection: ‘The form of the cognition becomes a proof for the establishment of the object, by tending to restrict the operations of a cause similar to itself.’

“Reply: Then is it that there is, in the external world, something that imparts the gross form (to the cognition). I wonder what would be the fate of such an assertion!

“For these reasons, we conclude that the appearance of the gross form in the cognition is not due to the object; because any thing of this nature has been proved above to be absent in the case of one cognition (that of Duality); and it is equally impossible in the case of other cognitions.”

“If this cognition (of the gross form of objects) were not due to an object, and were to be brought about at times by some cause or other, then, it would be conceived of either as non-existing, or as having any other form than the one in which it is perceived; or it might always be conceived of as non-existing; as it is as good as proved that it is not very easy to differentiate between the correct and mistaken forms of cognitions. Then again, at the time of cognising, the form of the cognition points to a similar object as its adequate and efficient cause, specially when it is understood that the form of the cause of a cognition is similar to that of the cognition itself. But this understanding is not possible when the object is not what is cognised; because any firm conviction, of one thing being similar to another and being its cause, depends upon the due cognition of both the things concerned. Hence we conclude that the existence of the object is not proved by the form of the cognition. For this reason too the fact of the object being the cause of the cognition cannot be accepted as constituting its apprehensibility; nor is the causal efficiency of the object capable of imparting its form to the object. Hence it is only right to assert that on account of any object not having the apprehensible character, there is nothing besides the cognition itself, which makes it conceivable.

“For the following reason also, there is no object apart from the cognition. The object being inaminate and non-intelligent, it could not manifest itself; nor can we find any other manifester for it; as in all cases there is the same one form of the object that is cognised. Even if there were any such manifester, unless that manifester itself were self-manifest it could not manifest the object. That which has its manifestation or appearance not manifest, cannot but be regarded as unmanifest, just as things behind a wall; and for you the external object is such as has its appearance not manifest; and then too that which would be the manifester of another, must, like the lamp, be independent, for its own manifestation, of anything else like itself; and as for cognition, it is clearly the manifester of something else; and under the circumstances it would be most unreasonable to asssert that the self-manifest cognition has the object for its manifester. If such were the case, then on the ground of the two always being found together, as between the omniscient and non-omniscient, so between the cognised and the cogniser also, there would be non-difference. Because wherever there is difference, there is no possibility of the two things being always found together; as for instance, we find that blue and yellow are never perceived simultaneously at one and the same place; and the fact of two things being always found together is the very contradictory of their not being found together; and thus on account of the presence of something concomitant with its contradictory, the certainty of difference becomes precluded and tends to prove the certainty of non-difference; and thus is established the premiss of our argument.

“Objection: ‘The word ‘saha’ (in ‘sahopalambha’) means either help or simultaneity: and as these are always concomitant with difference, the above argument is self-contradictory.’

“Reply: Not so; because what wo have put forward as the reason is not an assumed companionship; even in the stock example of the ‘two moons,’ there is no real companionship; as the moon is one only.

“Objection: ‘The moment cognised by the omniscient person apprehends, along with itself, all living beings; and yet these latter are not non-different from the cognition of omniscience; and thus your argument becomes inconclusive.’

“Reply: Not so; because there is no such absolute necessity as you imagine. Those things, whose companionship is with reference to moments of time, for them there is such an absolute necessity as you say; because the two moments are never again perceived individually; but this is not the companionship that we mean; what we mean is with reference to the series; and certainly there is no companionship or concomitance between the ‘series’ of the omniscient mind with that of an ordinary mind; as for the former it is possible, at certain times, to rest within itself; and at these times also he does not cease to be omniscient; as the power remains in him; e.g., the cook, even when he is not actually cooking, retains the character of the cook. Hence we conclude that what is known by a cognition does not differ from that cognition; as for instance, the cognition’s own self; and then we find that Blue &c. are known; if these were different from cognition, they could not be known by it; as the non-difference, which is the very necessary condition of such; cognisability, would be absent; the very appearance of the cognition not being the necessary condition; and then too, if any one thing were to be cognised by something wholly different from it, and not bearing any relationship to it, then there would be a total disorder. And further, in as much as in difference we cannot find the necessary condition, nor the all-pervading invariable relationship, this would preclude cognisability from difference, and relegate it to its contradictory, non-difference; and this establishes the premiss of our argument.

“The above also proves the non-difference of the form of ‘I’; (the cogniser), from cognition. As for the distinct notions that we come to have of the cognised, the cogniser and the cognition—these are only instances of misconceptions, like that on the ‘double moon’; and the cause of this misconception, as on all misconceptions, lies in the vāsanā of the beginningless and; unceasing flow of non-difference. To this effect we have the declaration: In all unmistaken cognitions the notion of difference is like the notion of two moons,

“Objection: ‘If there be no external object, then what would be the cause of the cognition appearing in the form of the blue (f.i.)? It has been well said that the idea of the object is of the form of the object; and the Idea has got that form as its qualification; and it deserves to be considered whether that cognition follows from the external world or from elsewhere.’

“To this the following reply is made: Even if the external object exists, what would be the cause of the cognition in question? The blue object could not be that cause; because this object is not what is seen,—the object being always beyond the reach of the senses. It might be urged that from the effects we could deduce and assume the object (to be amenable to the action of the senses). But in that case why cannot you assume a diversity of potencies in the preceding cognition it-self, which is quite perceptible? And this latter assumption would also explain the diversity of forms in Dream-cognition, which could not be attributed to the potency of objects belonging to different places and times, as none of these objects are extant at the time.

“Objection: ‘Well, in that case, there could be no variegated cognition; as cognition being one only, all cognitions, being nondifferent from it, would be one only; and if there were distinct cognitions, each with a distinct form, then, in as much as each of the cognitions would be restricted to its own form, there would be no cognition apart form these, which would appre-hend all the forms concerned.’

“To this we make the following reply: It Is not that a variegated form is never manifested; as any such assertion would be contrary to a fact of direct cognition. It is well known that a non-intelligent thing cannot be manifested; hence this variegated form also must be of the nature of cognition alone (which being intelligent would be easily manifestible). Nor does the diversity of cognitions depend upon the diversity of forms; as in the variegated form, there is no diversity of forms; just as in the blue substance, the blue character is the only form, so also in the variegated object, the variegated is the only form. And this being of the nature of cognition, when the cognition would operate towards itself in that form, it would operate either in its entirety, or not at all; and it would never operate partially; as the cognition has no parts. As for the parts that appear to us as distinct from one another, these do not constitute the ‘variegated’ form; and hence there is no incongruity in our view of the case.

“The gross form also may be explained in the same manner. There can be no single gross whole made up of a number of subtile parts; as it would have to be regarded as many, on account of its inhering in each of the many constituent parts. As for the form of the cognition however, in as much as it exists in a single cognition, it could very well be the one gross cognition. And as for the contradictory characteristics of trembling and non-trembling (as belonging to the gross object and the cognition respectively),—this some people are inclined to reject as contrary to real perception. While others hold that in as much as the form of the cognition appears only by the force of beginningless vāsanās, it transcends the limit of our thinking; and as such its essence must be regarded to lie in its falsity. That is to say—that which is a cognition is not based upon something in the external world, like the cognitions in a dream—the waking cognition of the post is a cognition—(and hence it could not be based upon any thing in the external world.) The Nirālambanatā—i.e. the not being based upon an eternal object—is found, in the case of dreams, to pertain to all cognitions; and the waking cognition also is a cognition hence if it were to renounce the character of not being based upon external objects, then it would renounce its own very nature.

“Objection: ‘If all cognitions were to be devoid of substratum in the external world, then the cognitions of the Major term, the Middle term and the Instance of an inferential argument would also be devoid of such a substratum; that would imply the non-existence of these; and then there could be no Inference and if these cognitions be accepted to have real substrata, them these would invalidate the reason given for holding all cognitions to be devoid of such substrata.’

“Reply: Not so; these cognitions also have no substrata in the external world; they come to help in the appearance of the inference, through their saṃvṛti (assumed) reality. We often find real knowledge following false things; for instance, have the cognition of tha real letter from the marks on pape [paper?] (which marks are not the real letters).

“Objection: ‘But the marks forming the letter are quite real in themselves.’

“Reply: True, they are real; but they are incapable of giving any meaning in the form of the marks; they afford mean-“ings only when the character of letter-sounds (which do not "exist in them in reality) are imposed upon them; and as such the usefulness of these marks lies in the unreal form thus imposed, and not upon the real form (of the mere lines).”

The above embodies in brief the Pūrvapakṣa, in reply whereto we have the following:—One of the arguments put forward by the opponent is based upon the absence in the object of the marks of apprehensibility. But this argument cannot prove the non-existence of the object. It may be that the external object may not be apprehensible; but that does not prove that it does not exist; specially as non-apprehensibility or nonperception might be due to the form of the object being remote (that is too far removed to be directly perceptible), as is the case with ghosts.

Objection: “If a thing that is perceptible is not perceived, that certainly proves that the thing does not exist.”

Reply: True; but how have you ascertained the fact of the external object being ‘perceptible.’? Its perception (according to you) has never occurred: If it has occurred, then the marks of perceptibility cannot be said to be absent from it. Then again, the perception of a thing depends upon the percipient; and the percipient cognition is limited to itself; so if this in itself is enough to prove that all else is imperceptible,—and the non-perception is due to the absence of anything that could be perceived,-then your reason or premiss becomes the same as your conclusion.

Then, again please explain this that you are asked—What is the ‘perceptibility’ of the form of cognition? It is not the cause of the cognition, as the two are non-different. Nor can this perceptibility be regarded as consisting in the imparting of the form to the cognition; as we do not perceive two forms in any cognition. Nor can ‘perceptibility’ be said to consist in the cognition itself; as in the state of deep sleep, though the nature of the cognition continues, like the series of cognitions, yet it is not perceived or apprehended.

Objection: “Perceptibility may consist in appearability or manifestibility.”

Reply: What do you mean by the ‘appearance' of the form of cognition?

Objection: “It is the Capability of rejection or acceptance as following upon cognition.”

Reply: This capability is present in the external object also. For instance, by the cognitions ‘this is blue,’ ‘this is yellow what one accepts, rejects or treats with indifference is the external object, and not anything within himself. And thus it is not-proved that the object is devoid of the marks of perceptibility.

Objection: “How can the production of one thing (cognition) constitute the capability (of rejection or acceptance) of another (the external object)?”

Reply: The peculiarities of the nature, the cause and the auxiliaries of the cognition produce, in the object, the character; of being used in accordance with those (form &c.); and as such there is not much force in the objection.

This same argument disposes of the arguments of the Pūrvapakṣin in regard to ‘cognisability’; as that too is produced by the peculiarities of the nature, cause and auxiliaries of they cognition; specially as this cognition serves the purpose of precluding all doubts and contrary notions with regard to the object.

Then, it has been argued that what is non-intelligent is incapable of manifestation or appearance. But if this incapability refer to such an object as has not manifestation itself for its very nature;—then the argument becomes redundant (as no one admits of the manifestation of such an object.) If however it be meant to refer to relationship and connection then it cannot be proved; because there is no royal command to the effect that the non-intelligent can have no relationship with manifestation. Just as the action of cutting becomes related to the object that is cut, and is yet distinct from it—so in the same manner, the action of cognising would be related to the cognised, and yet be distinct from it. Then, as for the invariability of the concomitance of the cognition with the cognised (which the opponent brings forward as proving the identity of the cognition and the cognised), it cannot absolutely prove the negation of the opposite conclusion (that is to say, that concomitance does not prove that the object is non-existent); as the simultaneity of the apprehension of the blue object and the cognition of blue could be possible even when cognisability belonged to something besides itself.

Objection: “But there being no external object, the cognition can not be percipient of anything besides itself.”

Reply: The preclusion of the conclusion opposite to yours could follow only upon the establishment of the non-existence of the external object; and the non-existence of the external object again you seek to prove by the negation of the opposite conclusion; this involves a mutual inter-dependence.

Objection: “Even if there is this inter-dependence—what of that?”

Reply. But as a matter of fact also, the invariability of concomitance between the cognised and the cognition, is not established; as whenever we have a cognition of the blue object, what is cognised as ‘blue’ is perceived as something external, while the cognition is perceived as something internal.

Objection: “The concomitance is proved by the self-apprehensibility of the cognition.”

Reply: What is the evidence for this self-apprehensibility?

Objection: “Whatever is manifested does not depend upon anything else, for its manifestation; as we find in the case of the lamp.”

Reply: The function of the lamp consists in the removing of the darkness from the place to which it is brought; and this operation having been done by itself, it does not, for that purpose, stand in need of another lamp; but for its own perception] it does need the eye and other organs of the person who would see or feel it; and thus your instance becomes totally devoid of the character you seek, to prove by it.

If by ‘manifestibility’ you mean the character of cognition and from that you deduce its independence of all other things, then your premiss becomes asādhāraṇa, ‘individualised’ or ‘specialised’ (and cannot prove anything).

Then again, it has been urged by the Pūrvapakṣin that, that thing whose manifestation or appearance is not manifest, is itself unmanifest, e.g. a thing hidden under a cover. But the unmanifest character of the hidden thing is not due to itself, but to it negation or absence; and as such, this instance does not prove the required concomitance (of non-appearance and non-self-manifestibility).

Another reason put forward is—‘because it is cognition (therefore it is devoid of eternal substratum, like dream-cognition.)’ But there is not much in this argument either; as the instance is not quite established; Dream-cognitions also have their substratum in assumed external substances, and do not rest wholly within themselves; as during dreams what are cognised are only such things as have been perceived during the waking state, which appear in consciousness on account of the impressions left by them upon the mind. If it were not so, then it could not be that only such things are dreamt of as have been seen or heard of or otherwise perceived before.

Then again, if the external object did not exist, what is it that is cognised as having a definite from—‘this is blue’?

Objection: “It is the form of the cognition that is cognised.”

Reply: Not so; as what is cognised is something outside the cognition. If the cognised were of the form of the cognition, then the cognition would be in the form ‘I am blue’ and not as ‘this is blue.’

Objection: “As the form of every cognition is distinct and peculiar to itself, some cognitions are apprehended in the form of ‘I,’ and others in that of ‘this’.”

Reply: But no particular cognition is formed to be appearing always in the form of ‘I’, as we have those pertaining to the form of ‘blue’ &c. (which always appear as blue). Because that which one person will perceive as ‘I’, another person will perceive as ‘you’.

Objection; "It is only when one cognises himself then the cognition is in the form of ‘I’.”

Reply: Then, is there a cognition of ‘something else’ also? (this the Pūrvapakṣī denies as all cognitions are only self-cognisable according to him).

Objection: “(No; but) it often happens that one’s own form is, by mistake, cognised as ‘something else’.”

Reply: When this difference is directly perceived, why do not you accept it as real?

Objection: “Well, the direct perception is a mistaken one, as has been well said: ‘after a cognition there appears a factor existing outside the cognition; and this idea of difference, with regard to cognition which is one and identical, must be regarded as mistaken.’”

How do you prove this?

“The identity of the cognition is proved by means of Inference.”

Reply: An inference could be possible only after the senseperception has been proved to be true and not false.—and the sense-perception you would prove to be mistaken, by means of Inference,—this would certainly be a case of queer inter-dependence. We grant, for the sake of argument, that the distinction is mistaken; but how is it that it is cognised only at particular places and at definite times? There certainly is no cause for restricting the assumption or imposition to a particular time and place.

Objection: “The restriction of the assumption would be due to the peculiarities of the vāsanā (of the cogniser).”

Reply: This is not possible; as there is no reason for restricting the operation of the vāsanā to any particular time or place. If however, there is an external object, then in whichsoever place that object would exist, at that place we would have its perception; and to that place would pertain the vāsanā preceding that cognition. When there is no object however, then towhat would be due the restriction of the place? Nor, without a particular cause, is a particular effect possible.

Objection: “As there would be no external object, the diversity could belong to the vāsanās alone; and this diversity is due, as in the case of your ‘object’, to the diversity of the causes of these vāsanās; and this process is beginningless.”

Reply: If the diversity of vāsanās were something other than the form of the cognition, then what would be the difference of one vāsanā from another? If however it be something other than the cognition, then why should you be so perverse to the existence of the object (something distinct from the cognition) and thereby upset the common notions of all men? By what too this form (of vāsanās) imposed outside? By cognition? Does this exterior imposition consist in the apprehension in itself of the form? Or is it something else? If the former, then it would come to this that, that which is its right apprehension is also the wrong apprehension! As the apprehension of the form as pertaining to the cognition would be right; while that pertaining to the outside would be wrong. If however, it were something else, then there could be no sequence in the appearance

of the two; as the cause, in the shape of the cognition, would be momentary (according to the Pūrvapakṣi-Bauddha); nor could one and the same thing, at one and the same time, be perceived as rigid and wrong. And yet there is no other way save those of sequence and simultaneity, wherein existing, the cognition could apprehend the form in itself and also impose it outside.

Then again, if the blue object were only in the form, of the cognition, then that cognition alone could apprehend it, of which this blue would be the form; and it could not be perceived by another person. As a matter of fact, however, we often find a single object being perceived by many persons, whenever all these persons have their attention turned towards it. We often find people saying ‘I have seen that which you have seen.’ From this we conclude that the object is not in the form of the cognition.

There are some extremists who deny even this idealistic form to the objects of perception, all of which they regard as unreal. But for these people there could be no restriction as to particular effects following only from particular causes, or that as to definite purposes being served only by certain definite objects. Because when there is no object, there is nothing that would be the cause of another, or everything would be the cause of everything; nor could there be any analogy, or want of analogy, in useful poses to be served, because of the absence of any differences. This has been well said by the revered teachers.—‘Those that are satis-purified with imaginary sweets, and those that have tasted real sweats that they have obtained,—would both have in their body the same organic changes (if the sweets had no real existence).”

Objection: “The distinction in such cases would be due to the differences of vāsanā.”

Reply: If the vāsanā were the cause of the particular purposes served in the world, then your theory differs from ours only in name—what you call ‘vāsanā’ we call ‘artha,’ ‘object.’ If the vāsanā be said to be of the nature of a cognition, then, in the absence of an object, any peculiarity in it would be without cause, baseless; as the only factor of ‘cognition’ would be common in all cases. And if you admit of peculiarities in the form of cognitions, as well as in some other shape, then that would amount to the admission of ‘objects.’

Then too, in accordance with this theory, the cognition of blue could not appear at certain times only, and not at all times; as the series of moments capable of producing it would continue always and everywhere. If they did not continue, then the cognition would not be possible at any future time.

Objection: "The cognition not standing in need of anything besides itself, and the fruition of the cause appearing only at particular times, it would follow that the effect of these also should appear only at particular times.”

Reply: The “fruition” of the cause is nothing else save its tending towards the production of the effect; and this too would depend only upon self-apprehension; and as such it could not appear only at certain times. As a matter of fact, a direct perception is always such as appears only at certain times. And this perception applies to the external object, which is cognised as pertaining to definite points of place and time; and hence it is this perception which sets aside all arguments brought forward to prove the non-existence of that object. And thus your premises become open to the fallacy of being ‘kālātyayāpadiṣṭa.’

Thus has Number been explained.