Chapter 5h - Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa in Advaita Vedānta

Śaṃkara (788-820 A.D), the founder of Advaita Vedānta, recognizes three sources of valid cognition, viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna, and āgama.^[1] Later Advaita Vedāntins add upamāna, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi. Dharmarājādhvarīndra (1550-1650 A.D) accept this sixth pramāṇas^[2] and clearly discusses all the pramāṇas in his Vedānta-paribhāṣā which yield empirical truth.

In the Advaita Vedānta, pratyakṣa as a pramāṇa is the unique cause (karaṇa) of pratyakṣa as a form of valid cognition (pramā). In this sense the sense-organs constitute the karaṇa or the unique cause of perceptual cognition. It is to be noted that Śaṃkara does not discuss the psychology of pratyakṣa and anumāna, we are not able to state his views.

Dharmarājādhvarīndra says,

“pratyakṣapramāyāḥ karaṇaṃ pratyakṣapramāṇam”^[3]

I.e. pratyakṣa pramā is the direct consciousness of objects obtained generally through the exercise of the senses.

In pratyakṣa there is actual contact between the percipient and the object of pratyakṣa.^[4] It is the cognition acquired through the operation of antaḥkaraṇavṛtti. In pratyakṣa the transparent antaḥkaraṇa goes out through the sense-organs, pervades the object, say, the jar and assumes the form of that object. This transformation of the internal organ in the form of the object is called antaḥkaraṇavṛrtti.^[5] Pratyakṣa is the immediate cognition in which the mental modification is non-different from the object and is lit up by the self’s light. When the eye is fixed on a jar, the internal organ is supposed to go out towards it, illuminate it by its own light, and assume its shape and cognize it. This inner activity is assumed to account for the transformation of the physical vibrations into mental states. If one simply stares at the blue sky, he cannot perceive anything. The internal organ functions like light, its vṛtti moves outwards in the form of an elongated ray of light. The vṛtti identifies itself with the object, and its identification might spread over the whole surrounding scene. What one perceives depends on the nature of the mode. If the mode takes the form of the weight of the object, one perceives weight; if of colour, one perceives colour. In the case of pratyakṣa of the jar, the consciousness determined by the jar is found to be unified with that determined by the vṛtti of the internal organ falling on that jar, even as the space (ākāśa) enclosed within a jar in the room is unified with that enclosed within the room itself. The two limiting conditions of ultimate consciousness, the modification and the object, do not produce a difference, since they are in the same spot. This unification makes the cognition of the jar perceptual in character, and marks off pratyakṣa from anumāna. In anumāna the mind only thinks the object but does not go out to meet it. Pratyakṣa is distinct from memory, since only past events are recollected. A further qualification is mentioned, that the object and the mental mode must belong to the present time (vartamānatva [vartamānatvam]).

According to Dharmarājādhvarīndra,

“tacca pratyakṣaṃ dvividham savialpakanirvikalpakabhedāt”^[6]

I.e. pratyakṣa is of two kinds: savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka.

Dharmarājādhvarīndra defines savikalpaka pratyakṣa as:

“tatra savikalpakaṃ vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi jñānam. yathā “ghaṭamahaṃ jānāmi” ityādijñānam”.^[7]

It means that the savikalpaka pratyakṣa is that cognition which apprehends relatedness of the substantive and the qualifying attribute (vaiśiṣṭya); for instance, cognition such as, ‘I know the jar’.

Here the object of the cognition is the jar as related to the subject ‘I’. Such type of pratyakṣa is called savikalpaka pratyakṣa. In savikalpaka pratyakṣa we have the distinction between the thing determined, the jar, and the determining attribute, jarness (ghaṭaghaṭatvayor vaiśiṣṭyam). In other words, savikalpaka pratyakṣa is the pratyakṣa of an object as distinct from the other objects, e.g., pratyakṣa of a jar as distinct from the other objects, say, table, chair, etc. A jar is perceived as different from the other objects, because the jar is perceived along with its class character ‘jarness’, which is found in all the jars but not in the other objects. Similarly any object is perceived along with its class character which is found in all the objects of that class but not in the other objects of different classes. Thus in the savikalpaka pratyakṣa the subject is the object perceived and the predicate is the attribute, which is predicated to the subject. In other words savikalpaka pratyakṣa is expressed through subject-predicate relation.^[8]

After the definition of savikalpaka pratyakṣa Dharmarājādhvarīndra gives the definition of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as:

“nirvikalpakantu saṃsargānavagāhi jñānam. yathā “sohayaṃ devadattaḥ”, “tattvamasi” ityādivākyajanyaṃ jñānam”^[9]

I.e. nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is that cognition which is non-relational apprehension; for instance, cognition arising from sentences like, ‘This is that Devadatta’, or ‘Thou art That’ etc.

This verbal cognition is nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. There is no subject-predicate relation in it. In nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa all determining attributes are left out of view. No distinction exists between s and p as in the propositions, ‘Thou art That’, ‘This is that Devadatta’. In these cases the cognition arises by ignoring the particular features. For instance, ‘this’ refers to the present and ‘that’ to the past, and these two being contradictory elements, have to be left out of consideration in recognizing the person Devadatta. Similarly, in the other instance, ‘thou’ and ‘that’ referring to something present and absent respectively, these differences have to be ignored before one can grasp the essential unity of the individual self and Brahman.^[10] In other words, in ‘Thou art That’, since the cogniser is the object, there is no difference between the consciousness of the cogniser and the consciousness of the mode in the form of the cogniser. We grasp the meaning of the proposition without apprehending the relation between its different parts. Hence in such cases the cognition is nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Actually, the Advaita Vedāntins hold that at the stage of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, one perceives only the identity of an object and, does not perceive that an object is different from the other objects.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Indian Philosophy, Vol-II, by S. Radhakishnan, p. 454.

[2]:

Vedānta Paribhāṣā, p. 8.

[3]:

Ibid. p. 8.

[4]:

In Advaita Vedānta, six different kinds of contact are admitted, viz. saṃyoga, saṃyuktatādātmya, saṃyuktābhinnatādātmya, tādātmya, tādātmyāvadabhinna, and viśeṣyaviśeṣanabhāva.—-Ibid. p. 31.

[5]:

“tathā taijasama antaḥkaraṇamapi cakṣurādidvārā nirgatya ghaṭādiviṣayadeśaṃ gatvā ghaṭādiviṣayākāreṇa pariṇamate. sa eva pariṇāmo vṛttirityucyate”. —-Ibid. p.14.

[6]:

Ibid. p. 32.

[7]:

Ibid. p. 32.

[8]:

Indian Philosophy, Vol-III, by Jadunath Sinha, p. 395.

[9]:

Vedānta Paribhāṣā, p. 32.

[10]:

Ibid. p. 33.