Verse 3.7.24

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 3.7.24:

अनाश्रिते तु व्यापारे निमित्तं हेतुरिष्यते ।
आश्रितावधिभावं तु लक्षणे लक्षणं विदुः ॥ २४ ॥

anāśrite tu vyāpāre nimittaṃ heturiṣyate |
āśritāvadhibhāvaṃ tu lakṣaṇe lakṣaṇaṃ viduḥ || 24 ||

24. The circumstance (nimitta) which works without depending upon any particular operation is called cause. That which assumes the form of a limit is called a sign (lakṣaṇa).

Commentary

The difference between ‘hetu’ (cause) and sādhana (means) is now pointed out.

[Read verse 24 above]

[If all that helps in the accomplishment of the action is kāraka or sādhana, the cause (hetu) would also come under it and the third case-affix would be added to it by the sūtras: kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā (P. 2.3.18) and P. 2.3.24 would become unnecessary. To meet this difficulty, the difference between means (sādhana) and cause (hetu) is pointed out. By ‘hetu’ is meant anything which is looked upon as the cause of something irrespective of whether it performs a function or operation or not. It should take a case-ending which is not connected with a means (kārakavibhakti). Such a case-ending is the sixth one (ṣaṣṭhī), but the sūtra ‘hetau’ (P. 2.3.23) prescribes the third case-ending instead. For example: adhyayanena vasati = He resides for study. Here study (adhyayana) is the cause (hetu) and residence (vāsa) is the effect (hetumat). Naiyāyikas say that only that which causes a substance or a quality can be called ‘hetu’ and that takes a case-ending not connected with a ‘means’ (Kārakavibhakti). That which is the cause of an action expressed by an action word is kāraka. Ex. vidyayā vasati, In the sūtra ‘anur lakṣaṇe’ (P. 1.4.84), the word ‘lakṣaṇa’ can means ‘hetu,’ also. But there is a difference between the two. That cause in which there is also the quality of being the limit is lakṣaṇa. Others distinguish between the two by saying that cause (hetu) is that which produces an effect and ‘lakṣaṇa’ is that which makes known something, or produces knowledge. That is not right because hetu also produces knowledge. When a person lives on his knowledge, the latter produces the knowledge as to how he lives (vidyāder api vāsādiniścaye vyāpārāt). In vṛkṣam anu vidyotate vidyut, vṛkṣa is a lakṣaṇa. Irrespective of the consideration whether it produces lightning or not, it is taken as the point of indication of lightning, Lightning flashes from the tree, after reaching the tree. But this is an example of P. 1.4.90. For P. 1.4.84, the example is: śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat = It rained after (anu) the recitation of the Saṃhitā by Śākalya. Here the Saṃhitā is not only the point of indication, but also the cause (hetu). It is called lakṣaṇa, because this hetu is also something which makes known (jñāpaka). Similarly, smoke is the sign (lakṣaṇa) of fire because the sight of it leads to the inference of fire. One has seen the two together so many times that when one sees it alone, one infers the existence of the other. It is true that one does not see rain following saṃhitā so often in real life. But if one has understood that a certain thing, has the power to produce a certain effect it can become its sign (lakṣaṇa) also. The rising of the clouds becomes the cause of our understanding that it will rain. One might argue that invariable concomittance is understood only after seeing two things together many times and not just once. One has not seen saṃhitā followed by rain many times. It may be the cause but seeing them together just once does not enable us to decide. So it cannot be a sign (lakṣaṇa) of rain just as the rising of clouds can be. To this the answer is that sometimes we decide that there is a relation of cause and effect between two things even after seeing their sequence just once. The reason is that if a thing is not the cause, the effect will not follow it even once. A rice plant will not come out of barley seed even once. To think of something else as the cause would upset the whole scheme of casuality. Nor can it be an accident because what is not the cause cannot produce the effect even once. If we see the saṃhitā produce rain definitely even once, we conclude that it is the cause. As the cause is also something which makes known, it has been called ‘lakṣaṇa’ in P. 1.4.84. The M. Bhā. says that lakṣaṇa includes hetu. The rising of the clouds is not only the cause of rain, it is also an indication, a sign of it. Even that which is a limit (avadhi) becomes a sign only if it causes the knowledge of something. The fact is that a sign (lakṣaṇa) is of many kinds. Sometimes, a thing is a lakṣaṇa, because it is a limit (avadhi) as the tree in the case of lightning. Sometimes, it makes the cause to be known, as in the case of the smoke. Sometimes, it makes the effect to be known, as in the case of clouds. Saṃhitā is both the cause and the sign of rain. P. 1.4.90 makes ‘anu’ a karmapravacanīya (postposition) in the sense of ‘sign’ which includes cause also. P. 1.4.84 has been given in order to exclude the third caseaffix expressive of cause (P. 2.3.23). ‘Anu’ has been given the name of karmapravacanīya twice, once in P. 1.4.84 to exclude the third case-affix and again in P. 1.4.90 to bring in the second case-affix.

The conclusion is: A do-er (kāraka) is that which helps in the accomplishment of an action by assuming different forms; that which helps in a general way is cause (hetu) and that which makes something else known is a sign (lakṣaṇa).]

The author now points out the difference in the scope of ‘hetu’ and ‘sādhana’ though they both produce effects.