Sūtra 4.23

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 4.23:

तदसङ्ख्येयवासनाभिश्चित्रमपि परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वात् ॥ ४.२३ ॥

tadasaṅkhyeyavāsanābhiścitramapi parārthaṃ saṃhatyakāritvāt || 4.23 ||

23. It exists for another’s purpose, though coloured by uncountable residua, because it operates by association.

The Rajamartanda commentary by King Bhoja:

[English translation of the 11th century commentary by Bhoja called the Rājamārtaṇḍa]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Suspecting that it may be argued that if all purposes are accomplished by a thinking principle of this kind, why should we acknowledge an experiencer of which there is no proof, he gives the proofs (in support of the existence) of the spectator.

[Read Sūtra 4.23]

“It,” the thinking principle, “coloured,” i.e., assuming many forms, through the influence of an uncountable number of “residua” (yāsanā) (existing in it), effectuates for “another's,” i.e., a master’s, “purpose” (artha) the work of experience and final reward. How so? “Because it operates by association.” “Association” (saṃhatya) i.e., by fully joining together, operates to accomplish a purpose. We see that works performed jointly are for another, as in the case of a bed or a chair. The co-operators (in this case) are the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which, modifying in the form of the thinking principle, jointly work for another, and that “another” is soul.

It may be urged that through the force of the example by which the subservience of another's purpose by an embodied stranger, as a bed or a chair or the like, is established, a similar (embodied) stranger may be proved, but you contemplate an unembodied “another,” and, the opposite being proved, your argument becomes destructive of the object. The reply is thus given: Although in the example pervasion of the premiss has been accepted as general in regard to effectuating another's purpose, yet on consideration of the specific distinctions of goodness in the qualified, the distinction will be evident, and the position that the experiencer is another is established. Thus, as in inferring the existence of fire in a mountain covered with fuel of a particular kind from the smoke seen there, the inference that fire is produced by fuel and is distinct from other fires is taken for granted, so here in inferring that the specific experience called goodness is for another's purpose. In the same way the experiencing superior is proved to be another of the form of intelligence and isolated. Although he appears as the other and the noblest of all, yet the body is superior to objects resulting from the quality of darkness, because it is manifest, and the asylum of the organs. The organs are superior to the body; to them the illuminating quality of goodness is superior; and he who is the illuminator is distinct from illumination and of the form of intelligence. How can then there arise this conjunction? (i.e., there is no actual conjunction but a mere shadow).

Notes and Extracts

[Notes and comparative extracts from other commentaries on the Yogasūtra]

[The explanations given in previous aphorisms still leave the door-open to the argument that the agency of the soul is redundant and not wanted. If the thinking principle doubly modified as above stated is sufficient for conception, why make the soul the experiencer of worldly joys and sorrows? To this question the reply given is that, though the thinking principle is actuated by innumerable desires resulting from the residua of former works, it nevertheless acts for another’s purpose, and not for itself, since it acts by the co-operation of many causes, and not of its own motion. Though there are innumerable residua in it, they cannot work until external agencies are brought to bear upon them, and that shows that the thinking principle has no power of action suo motu, It is unconscious too, so that it can. have no will of its own. It acts only when it is worked upon, and this is indicated by the phrase “operates by association.” Inasmuch, however, as its action may tend to bring on liberation which is for the good of the soul, it is to be inferred that in its other actions it subserves the gratification of that soul. No line can be drawn between what actions are for the soul and what are not, and logically what is true for a part, i.e., for liberation, must be true for the whole. This idea is expressed in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā by the verse “generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities,” (lx). It should be noticed, however, that the functions which are usually attributed to nature or Prakṛti in the Sāṅkhya are invariably assigned to the thinking principle (citta) in the Yoga of Patañjali. In fact, in the Yoga system, citta plays a more important part than the Buddhi of Kapila, and appertains to itself the character both of Buddhi and Prakṛti, but the commentator does not mark this distinction. In his works Kapila frequently refers to Prakṛti where Patañjali confines himself to Citta. The action of the unconscious thinking principle for another's purpose is usually explained by the illustration of the saffron cart, which, unconscious as it is, subserves the purpose of man by bringing him a desirable condiment.]

He now proceeds to show by ten aphorisms that the fruit of this philosophy is isolation.