Verse 1489-1491

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

शब्दज्ञानात्परोक्षार्थज्ञानं शाब्दं परे जगुः ।
तच्चाकर्तृकतो वाक्यात्तथा प्रत्ययिनोदितात् ॥ १४८९ ॥
इदं च किल नाध्यक्षं परोक्षविषयत्वतः ।
नानुमानं च घटते तल्लक्षणवियोगतः ॥ १४९० ॥
धर्मी धर्मविशिष्टो हि लिङ्गीत्येतत्सुनिश्चितम् ।
न भवेदनुमानं च यावत्तद्विषयं न तत् ॥ १४९१ ॥

śabdajñānātparokṣārthajñānaṃ śābdaṃ pare jaguḥ |
taccākartṛkato vākyāttathā pratyayinoditāt || 1489 ||
idaṃ ca kila nādhyakṣaṃ parokṣaviṣayatvataḥ |
nānumānaṃ ca ghaṭate tallakṣaṇaviyogataḥ || 1490 ||
dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭo hi liṅgītyetatsuniścitam |
na bhavedanumānaṃ ca yāvattadviṣayaṃ na tat || 1491 ||

Other people have declared ‘verbal cognition’ to be “that knowledge of imperceptible things which is derived from words”;—and [they provide the following account of it],—“that cognition is derived from (a) the eternal sentence and from (b) the sentence uttered by a trustworthy person.—This cannot be ‘sense-perception’, because the object apprehended by it is beyond the reach of the senses;—nor can it be ‘inference because it is devoid of the characteristic features of inference;—until the subject (minor term) is definitely known to be possessed of the probandum and also of the probans, it cannot be regarded as a case of ‘inference’ of that subject.—(1489-1491)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Author now proceeds to show how the other so-called ‘Means or Forms of Knowledge’ are not real Means or Forms of Knowledge—or how, if they are real Means or Forms of Cognition, they are included under the two postulated by the Buddhist.

The additional Means or Forms of Knowledge posited by others are the following:—(1) Verbal Cognition, (2) Analogical Cognition, (3) Presumption, (4) Negation, (5) Ratiocinative Cognition, (6) Non-apprehension, (7) Probability, (8) Tradition and (9) Intuition.

As regards Verbal Cognition, the Author says as follows:—[see verses 1489-1491 above]

Śabarasvāmin (in his Mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya on 1. 1. 5) has provided the following definition of Verbal Cognition:—“That cognition of things not within reach of the senses which proceeds from the cognition of words is called Verbal”; which means that the Specific Individuality of the word having been apprehended, the cognition that follows after that, in regard to things beyond the reach of the Senses, is called Verbal Cognition, because it is derived from words.

“This Verbal Cognition is of two kinds—(1) Proceeding from words not emanating from human beings, and (2) Proceeding from the words of trustworthy persons.—This cognition is different, from Sense-perception, because the object apprehended by it is beyond the reach of the senses.—Nor is it Inference; as it is devoid of the ‘three features For instance, the object of Inferential Cognition is the Subject (Minor Term) which is qualified by the character that is sought to be proved (i.e. the Probandmn),—not merely the Subject by itself, nor the character by itself; and until the Probans is definitely known as having the same character and as appertaining to the same Subject,—the Inference cannot proceed. That is to say, until the presence of the Probans in the Subject is definitely cognised with certainty, there can be no Inference”.—(1489-1491)

Question—Why cannot this condition of the definite cognition of the Probans in the Subject be fulfilled in the case in question?

Answer:—[see verse 1492 next]