Verse 488-489

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

संक्षेपोऽयं विनष्टाच्चेत्कारणात्कार्यसम्भवः ।
प्रध्वस्तस्यानुपाख्यत्वान्निष्कारणमिदं भवेत् ॥ ४८८ ॥
अविनष्टाच्च तज्जातावनेकक्षणसंभवात् ।
क्षणिकत्वं न भावानां व्याहन्येत तदा कथम् ॥ ४८९ ॥

saṃkṣepo'yaṃ vinaṣṭāccetkāraṇātkāryasambhavaḥ |
pradhvastasyānupākhyatvānniṣkāraṇamidaṃ bhavet || 488 ||
avinaṣṭācca tajjātāvanekakṣaṇasaṃbhavāt |
kṣaṇikatvaṃ na bhāvānāṃ vyāhanyeta tadā katham || 489 ||

“The upshot briefly is this:—If the effect were produced from a cause that has perished, then such an effect would be without cause,—as what has perished can have no character (or potentiality).—If the effect be held to be produced from a cause that has not perished,—then, as the cause in that case would continue to exist during several moments,—wherefore could the ‘momentary character’ of things not become discarded (on that account)?”—(488-489)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

What has been already explained above is now briefly summed up:—[see verses 488-489 above and previous verses]

Only two views are possible in this connection:—(1) The Effect is produced out of the Cause which is itself destroyed, and (2) that it is produced out of the Cause which is not destroyed; things cannot be other than either destroyed or not destroyed. The first view cannot be right; because what has been destroyed is non-existent, and if production from that were admitted, the effect would have to be regarded as without Cause; which would mean that it is eternally existent.—Nor can the second view be right; as, in that case, things would continue to exist during several moments, which would deprive them of the character of momentariness.—‘Wherefore could it not be discarded?’—i.e. it would certainly become discarded. For instance, it would mean that—(a) the Thing comes into existence, then (b) it acts, then (c) it produces the Effect, then (d) it perishes; so that it is there during all these several moments; which rejects the idea of its being ‘momentary’.—(488-489)